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ABSTRACT
Reasoning about the activities of cyber threat actors is critical to defend against cyber
attacks. However, this task is difficult for a variety of reasons. In simple terms, it is difficult
to determine who the attacker is, what the desired goals are of the attacker, and how they will
carry out their attacks. These three questions essentially entail understanding the attacker’s
use of deception, the capabilities available, and the intent of launching the attack. These
three issues are highly inter-related. If an adversary can hide their intent, they can better
deceive a defender. If an adversary’s capabilities are not well understood, then determining
what their goals are becomes difficult as the defender is uncertain if they have the necessary
tools to accomplish them. However, the understanding of these aspects are also mutually
supportive. If we have a clear picture of capabilities, intent can better be deciphered. If we
understand intent and capabilities, a defender may be able to see through deception schemes.
In this dissertation, I present three pieces of work to tackle these questions to obtain
a better understanding of cyber threats. First, we introduce a new reasoning framework
to address deception. We evaluate the framework by building a dataset from DEFCON
capture-the-flag exercise to identify the person or group responsible for a cyber attack.
We demonstrate that the framework not only handles cases of deception but also provides
transparent decision making in identifying the threat actor. The second task uses a cognitive
learning model to determine the intent – goals of the threat actor on the target system.
The third task looks at understanding the capabilities of threat actors to target systems by
identifying at-risk systems from hacker discussions on darkweb websites. To achieve this
task we gather discussions from more than 300 darkweb websites relating to malicious
hacking.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Reasoning about threat actors
Reasoning about the activities of cyber threat actors is critical to defend against cyber
attacks. In doing so, three broad factors need to be considered: the attacker’s use of
deception, the capabilities available, and the intent of launching the attack (see Fig. 1.1).
For a threat actor to pose risk, he/she must intend to do harm and have the capabilities
and resources to conduct a cyber attack [120, 81, 96, 127]. If we understand intent and
capabilities, a defender may be able to see through deception schemes to identify the
attacker – termed as cyber attribution. For real-world applications, security vendors take into
consideration a threat actor’s ability to pose a threat while designing products and services
for threat assessment [40, 39]. The analysis that underpins reasoning about the activities
of threat actors involves many diverse sources of data: network traffic, malware analysis
including code similarity, and intelligence analysis from various hacker forums, to name
a few. Independent and diverse sources of reporting strengthen an analytic argument. The
process, flaws, outcomes, and methodology of understanding and identifying such threat
actors have become a subject of increasingly broad interest over the past few years. Part of
this is due to the increase in cyber-activity and the intersection of that cyber-activity with the
public sphere. For example, it used to be that a major company being hacked would be of
concern only to that company and its customers; however, the compromise of Sony Pictures
allegedly by North Korea in late 2014 elevated public interest in the accurate attribution of
cyber-aggression to the national level.
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Reasoning about
Threat Actors
Intent
Goals of the attacker 
behind the attack
Capability
Ability to achieve 
goals (intent) behind 
the attack
Tackle 
deception schemes
Fig. 1.1: Reasoning about threat actors.
1.2 Literature Overview
Previous research on understanding cyber threat landscape has focused on vulnerability
analysis and prediction using public vulnerability disclosures databases like NVD [138, 16]
and Twitter [106] as data sources. The reported results show poor predictive capability of
NVD [86] and that the data sampling is not reflective of real world scenarios [21] but none
leverage darkweb 1 sites as a source of intelligence for assessing threats. We observe that
darkweb marketplaces gives threat actors access to resources that can be leveraged to carry
out cyber attacks. Determining the intentions of a threat actor behind an attack is important
to assess a threat. Intent refers to goals the attacker is trying to achieve on the compromised
system. This can be inferred by analyzing malware/exploits used in the attack. Most
malware analysis techniques look at identifying if the software is malicious or not [38, 123]
or identifying which family the malware belongs to [8, 60, 61] without identifying the
intentions of the software which in practice is largely human driven. More recently, there
has been work on directly inferring the intent of a malware [54]. This approach leverages
static malware analysis (i.e. analysis of the malware sample conducted without execution,
such as decompilation) and a comparison with a crowd-source database of code snippets
using a proprietary machine leaning approach. However, a key shortcoming of the static
1“darkweb” refers to the anonymous communication provided by crypto-networks like
“Tor”
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method is that it is of limited value when the malware authors encrypt part of their code as
we saw with the infamous Gauss malware [59]. The goal of understanding a threat can lead
to better cyber attribution. Identifying the threat actors responsible for a given cyber event is
challenging due to lack of a reasoning framework to handle deception and representative
data to evaluate proposed frameworks in the literature. Currently cyber attribution looks to
identify machines, as opposed to a given hacker and his/her affiliations [14] or clustering
common IP sources together [34].
1.3 Motivation
Most technologies designed to aid in cyber security are “introspective” meaning that they
focus on examining vulnerabilities and abnormalities of the system being defended. Tools
for this type of analysis have ranged from the traditional firewall and intrusion detection
system to more recent systems using sophisticated anomaly detection or threat signatures
using information shared amongst different organizations. However, an alternative viewpoint
is to examine the environment of malicious cyber threat actors that lets an organization get a
better understanding of the threat landscape in terms of intent and capability of the threat
actor to defend itself and also identify the threat actor responsible for conducting the cyber
attack.
In the spring of 2017, the Internet was gripped by a widespread ransomware attack,
dubbed WannaCry; the ransomware spread as a worm affecting 300,000 machines in 150
countries, holding files hostage with encryption and promising decryption if a payment was
made to a Bitcoin address. Hackers took advantage of the fact that many systems were not
updated with the patch released by Microsoft, leaving them vulnerable. The attack was
in fact discussed on darkweb forums in several languages including English and Russian
as identified by cybersecurity company CYR3CON [122]; they also reported that hackers
choose medical institutions as prime targets based on the history of paid ransom from
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similar institutions. Hence the discussions on these darkweb platforms provides valuable
information regarding the capabilities as well as the intent of threat actors and should be
considered in identifying them.
Why do we reason about the activities of threat actors, and who is the customer of
this reasoning? Law enforcement and the courts care about cyber attribution decisions
when making investigative or legal decisions taking into account the intent and capability
of the threat actor. In other spheres, it can help guide the direction and proportion of
an organizational response to a cyber attack. For example, if a commercial company
can determine if an attacker is part of an unsophisticated hacktivist gang rather than a
sophisticated criminal enterprise (based on the intent and capability of the group), they
could simply re-install the compromised computers as a defensive response rather than
engaging with law enforcement. Likewise, according to Wheeler et al., “many offensive
techniques, such as computer network attack, legal action (e.g., arrests and lawsuits), and
kinetic energy attacks, can only be deployed if the source of the attack can be attributed with
high confidence” [136].
In addition to understanding and identifying threat actors, we also ask: how do re-
searchers train and evaluate these models? Using cyber attack data gathered from the real
world is problematic for a few reasons. First, it is difficult to get real-world data due to the
sensitive nature of the data. Additionally, even if the data were available, it is difficult to trust
ground truth about that data. Could attackers’ deceptions go unnoticed in this data? Who
can say? To enable researchers to develop and evaluate their tools, we provide pre-processed
data from capture-the-flag (CTF) contests, where access to the ground truth is available.
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation and Contributions
The central goal of this dissertation is to understand and reason about the activities of
threat actors in terms of the intent and capability to conduct a cyber attack with the goal of
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performing cyber attribution. The dissertation is divided in three parts. In the first part, we
introduce a new reasoning framework to address deception. We evaluate the framework by
building a dataset from DEFCON capture-the-flag exercise to identify the person or group
responsible for a cyber attack. We demonstrate that the framework not only handles cases
of deception but also provides transparent decision making in identifying the threat actor
(Chapter 2 and 3). In the second part, we introduce a cognitive learning model to determine
the intent – goals of the threat actor on the target system by analyzing the malware/exploits
used (Chapter 4). The third part looks at understanding the capabilities of threat actors. To
achieve this task we first gather discussions from more than 300 darkweb websites relating
to malicious hacking (Chapter 5). Then, we leverage the reasoning framework to identify
at-risk target systems (capable of exploitation) from hacker discussions on darkweb websites
(Chapter 6). Finally, the dissertation is concluded in Chapter 7 with a summary of results
presented in this work and future research directions. Literature corresponding to each of
the specific problem is reviewed in the corresponding Chapter.
Chapter 2: Cyber-Deception and Attribution in Capture-the-Flag Exercises
Attributing the culprit of a cyber-attack is widely considered one of the major technical and
policy challenges of cyber-security. The lack of ground truth for an individual responsible
for a given attack has limited previous studies. In this Chapter, we overcome this limitation
by leveraging DEFCON capture-the-flag (CTF) exercise data where the actual ground-truth
is know. We use various classification techniques to identify the culprit in a cyberattack
and find that deceptive activities account for the majority of misclassified samples. We also
explore several heuristics to alleviate some of the misclassification caused by deception.
Chapter 3: Argumentation Models for Cyber Attribution
In this Chapter, we employ a more principled approach to counter deception based on the
previously established theoretical framework for reasoning about cyber-attribution [114].
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In particular we employ temporal reasoning to tackle the problem of deceptive attacks
encountered in Chapter 2. We tackled an interesting research problem of identifying hacking
group from a series of attacks over a period of time – differentiating between deceptive
hacking groups.
We introduce an argumentation model based on the DeLP (Defeasible Logic Program-
ming) framework designed to aid analysts in attributing cyber-attacks. Apart from the basic
argumentation machinery, the framework makes use of latent variables to reduce the space
of possible culprits (attackers)—the resulting system is therefore a hybrid between classical
knowledge representation and reasoning techniques and machine learning classifiers. We
report on results obtained from a prototype implementation, showing that our approach
yields much higher accuracy than approaches reported in Chapter 2 (evaluated on the same
dataset) that rely on machine learning classifiers alone—a jump from 37% to 64.5%. The
result is an efficient and scalable reasoning framework designed to aid analysts in attributing
cyber-attacks.
Chapter 4: Determination of Adversarial Intent
Malware reverse-engineering, specifically, identifying the tasks (intent) a given piece of
malware was designed to perform (e.g., logging keystrokes, recording video, establishing
remote access) is a largely human-driven process that is a difficult and time-consuming
operation. In this chapter, we present an automated method to identify malware tasks using
two different approaches based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture, a popular implementa-
tion of a unified theory of cognition. Using three different malware collections, we explore
various evaluations for each of an instance-based and rule-based model - including cases in
which the training data differs significantly from test; where the malware being evaluated
employs packing to thwart analytical techniques; and conditions with sparse training data.
We find that our approach based on cognitive inference consistently out-performs the current
state-of-the art software for malware task identification as well as standard machine learning
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approaches - often achieving an unbiased F1 score of over 0.9.
Chapter 5: Darkweb and Deepweb Mining for Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence
In this Chapter, we present an operational system for cyber threat intelligence gathering
from various social platforms on the Internet particularly sites on the darkweb and deepweb.
We focus our attention to collecting information from hacker forum discussions and market-
places offering products and services focusing on malicious hacking. We have developed an
operational system for obtaining information from these sites for the purposes of identifying
emerging cyber threats. At the time of development the system was actively collecting
approximately 305 cyber threats each week. These threat warnings include information on
newly developed malware and exploits that have not yet been deployed in a cyber-attack.
This provides a significant service to cyber-defenders. The system is significantly augmented
through the use of various data mining and machine learning techniques. With the use of
machine learning models, we are able to recall 92% of products in marketplaces and 80%
of discussions on forums relating to malicious hacking with high precision. We provide
analysis on the data collected, demonstrating its application to aid a security expert for better
threat analysis.
Chapter 6: At-Risk System Identification via Analysis of Discussions on the Darkweb
Threat assessment of systems is critical to organizations’ security policy. Identifying systems
likely to be at-risk by threat actors can help organizations better defend against likely cyber
attacks. Currently, identifying such systems to a large extent is guided by the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Previous research has demonstrated poor correlation
between a high CVSS score and at-risk systems. In this Chapter, we leverage hacker
discussions on darkweb marketplaces and forums collected using the system introduced in
Chapter 5 to identify the platforms, vendors, and products likely to be at-risk by hackers.
This gives us an indicator regarding the hacker capability of targeting systems based on their
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discussions.
We employ and modify the reasoning system introduced in Chapter 3 that combines
DeLP (Defeasible Logic Programming) and machine learning classifiers to identify systems
based on hacker discussions observed on the darkweb. The modified system takes into
account the hierarchical structure of identifying a system in terms of its platform, vendor
and product. The system is evaluated on hacker discussions from nearly 300 darkweb
forums and marketplaces. We improved precision by 15%–57% while maintaining recall
over baseline approaches.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we first recapitulate the main ideas and results presented in the dissertation.
Then some directions for extending the dissertation are given.
1.5 Summary of Contributions
Table 1.1 summarizes the contributions of the dissertation. The contributions can be
split into three broad parts: 1) construction of reasoning framework capable of handling in-
consistent and contradictory information in case of deception and to identify at-risk systems
2) construction of models for automated malware analysis to determine adversarial intent –
the goals of the attacker on the host system and 3) Collected and pre-processed datasets to
evaluate cyber attribution models and applications relating to cyber threat intelligence.
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Table 1.1: Contribution Summary
Contribution Summary
Reasoning framework
[92, 94, 93]
• A framework that combines classical knowledge representation and
reasoning techniques (DeLP) and machine learning classifiers to han-
dle inconsistent and contradictory information.
• The framework allows for transparent devision making aiding a secu-
rity analyst to review the decision made.
• Applied to the problem of cyber-attribution with improved perfor-
mance over leveraging only machine learning classifiers.
• Applied to the problem of At-risk system identification from hacker
discussions on darkweb by modifying the framework to handle hierar-
chical decision making.
Cognitive Models
[87, 124, 63]
• Two different models based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture -
Instance-based and Rule-based for automated malware analysis to
determine the goals of the attacker on the host system.
• Evaluated on three different malware collections (with encrypted and
mutated malware samples) with parameter exploration and scalability
experiments.
Data Collection
[92, 89, 103]
• We assemble and make available a dataset of cyber-attacks with ground
truth derived from the traffic of DEFCON CTF.
• Hacker discussions and items gathered from more than 300 darkweb
forums and marketplaces in an automated way in real time.
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Chapter 2
CYBER-DECEPTION AND ATTRIBUTION IN CAPTURE-THE-FLAG EXERCISES
2.1 Introduction
Attributing the culprit of a cyber-attack is widely considered one of the major technical
and policy challenges of cyber-security. The lack of ground truth for an individual respon-
sible for a given attack has limited previous studies. In this work, we take an important
first step toward developing computational techniques toward attributing the actual culprit
(here hacking group) responsible for a given cyber-attack. We leverage DEFCON capture-
the-flag (CTF) exercise data which we have processed to be amenable to various machine
learning approaches. Here, we use various classification techniques to identify the culprit
in a cyber-attack and find that deceptive activities account for the majority of misclassified
samples. We also explore several heuristics to alleviate some of the misclassification caused
by deception. In this chapter:
• We assemble a dataset of cyber-attacks with ground truth derived from the traffic of
the CTF held at DEFCON 21 in 2013.
• We analyze this dataset to identify cyber-attacks where deception occurred.
• We frame cyber-attribution as a multi-class classification problem and leverage several
machine learning approaches. We find that deceptive incidents account for the vast
majority of misclassified samples.
• We introduce several pruning techniques and show that they can reduce the effect
of deception as well as provide insight into the conditions in which deception was
employed by the participants of the CTF.
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2.2 Dataset
2.2.1 Background
The DEFCON security conference sponsors and hosts a capture the flag (CTF) competi-
tion every year, held on site with the conference in Las Vegas, Nevada. DEFCON CTF is
one of the oldest and best-known competitions. The ctftime.org site provides a ranking for
CTF teams and CTF competitions, assigning it the highest average weight.
CTF competitions can be categorized by what role the competitors play in the com-
petition: either red team, blue team, or a combination. In a blue team focused CTF, the
competitors harden their systems against a red team played by the organizers of the CTF. In
a combined red/blue team CTF, every team plays both blue and red team simultaneously.
The NCCDC and CDX competitions are examples of a blue team CTF, while DEFCON
CTF is a combined red/blue team. Each team is simultaneously responsible for hardening
and defending their systems as well as identifying vulnerabilities and exploiting them in
other teams’ systems.
The game environment is created primarily by the DEFCON CTF organizers. The game
focuses around programs (known in the game as services) written by the organizers and
engineered to contain specific vulnerabilities. The binary images of the services are made
available to each team at the start of the game, but no other information is released. Part
of the challenge is identifying the purpose of each service, as well as the vulnerabilities
they present. Identification of vulnerabilities serves both a defensive and offensive goal;
once a vulnerability has been identified, a team may patch this vulnerability in the binary
program. Additionally, the teams may create exploits for that vulnerability and use them to
attack other teams and capture digital flags from those teams’ systems.
Each team is also provided with a server running the services, which contains the digital
flags to be defended. To deter defensive actions such as powering off the server or stopping
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the services, the white team (a third team, played by the organizers) conducts periodic
availability tests of the services running on each team’s server. A team’s score is the sum
of the value of the flags they have captured, minus the sum of the flags that have been
captured from that team, multiplied by an availability score determined by how often the
white team was able to test that team’s services. This scoring model incentivizes teams to
keep their server online, identify the vulnerabilities in services and patch them quickly, and
exploit other teams’ services to capture their flags. It disincentivizes teams from performing
host-level blocking and shutting down services, as this massively impacts their final score.
This game environment can be viewed as a microcosm of the global Internet, and the
careful game of “cat and mouse” between hacking groups and companies. Teams are free to
use different technical means to discover vulnerabilities—they may use fuzzing and reverse
engineering on their own programs, or they may monitor the network data sent to their
services and dynamically study the effects that network data has on unpatched services. If a
team discovers a vulnerability and uses it against another team, the first team may discover
that their exploit is re-purposed and used against them within minutes.
The organizers of DEFCON CTF capture all of the network traffic sent and received
by each team, and publish this traffic at the end of the competition [35]. This includes IP
addresses for source and destination, as well as the full data sent and received and the time
the data was sent or received. This data is not available to contestants; depending on the
organizers’ choice from year to year, the contestants either have a real-time feed but with
the IP address obscured, or a full feed delivered on a time delay of minutes to hours.
2.2.2 Analysis
We use the data from the CTF tournament held at DEFCON 21 in 2013; the dataset is
very large, about 170 GB in compressed format. We used multiple systems with distributed
and coordinated processing to analyze the data—fortunately, analyzing individual streams is
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Table 2.1: Fields in an instance of network attack
Field Intuition Example Value
byte hist Histogram of byte sequences in the payload 0×43:245, 0×69:8, 0×3a:9, .....
inst hist Histogram of instructions used in the pay-
load
cmp:12, subs:8, movtmi:60 ......
from team The team where the payload originates (at-
tacking team)
Blue Lotus
to team The team being attacked by the exploit Robot Mafia
time Indicates the date and time of the attack 2013-08-03T23:45:17
easy to parallelize. We identified the TCP ports associated with each vulnerable service and
then used the open source tool tcpflow to process the network captures into a set of files,
with each file representing data sent or received on a particular connection.
With these data files identified, we analyzed some of them by hand using the Interactive
Disassembler (IDA) to determine if the data contained shell-code, which in fact was the
case. We used an automated tool to produce a summary of each data file as a JSON encoded
element. Included in this summary was a hash of the contents of the file and a histogram of
the processor instructions contained in the file. These JSON files were the final output of the
low-level analysis, transforming hundreds of gigabytes of network traffic into a manageable
set of facts about exploit traffic in the data. Each JSON file is a list of tuples (time-stamp,
byte-histogram, instruction-histogram, attack team and target team). The individual fields
of the tuple are listed in Table 2.1. This pre-processing phase can be summarized in the
following steps:
• Un-tar the archives available from the organizers; this produces a large number of
pcap-ng formatted files that contain the traffic captures.
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• Convert the pcap-ng files to tcpdump format capture using the editcap utility. This
will allow tcpflow to process the data.
• Use xargs and GNU parallel to run tcpflow on each pcap. This took some time, and
produced a directory structure with files for data sent and received on host-port socket
pairs. This step of processing allows file-based tools to process the network data.
• Finally, develop (and run, in parallel) a tool to process each file containing data sent or
received by network ports associated with CTF challenges. This produced summary
statistics for each data stream: a byte histogram, overall size, a hash, and an ARM
instruction histogram (we ran a linear sweep with the Capstone instruction decoder to
produce this). This data was saved via JSON.
After this pre-processing of the network data packets, we have around 10 million network
attacks consisting of about 1 million unique exploits built and used by 20 teams in the
competition. In order to attribute an attack to a particular team, apart from analyzing the
payloads used by the team, we also need to analyze the behavior of the attacking team
towards their adversary. For this purpose, we separate the network attacks according to the
team being targeted. Thus, we have 20 such subsets (Table 4.3), which we denote with T-i,
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 20}. We also define deceptive attacks where multiple teams target
the same team using the same exploit. Fig. 2.1 shows the distribution of unique deceptive
attacks with respect to the total unique attacks in the dataset based on the target team. These
unique deceptive attacks amount to just under 35% of the total unique attacks. The resulting
processed dataset is publicly available for research purposes 1 .
We now discuss two important observations from the dataset, that makes the task of
attributing a observed network attack to a team difficult.
1https://cysis.engineering.asu.edu/cyber-attribution/
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Table 2.2: Teams in the CTF competition
Notation Team Notation Team
T-1 9447 T-11 clg
T-2 APT8 T-12 men in black hats
T-3 Alternatives T-13 more smoked leet chicken
T-4 PPP T-14 pwnies
T-5 Robot Mafia T-15 pwningyeti
T-6 Samurai T-16 routards
T-7 The European Nopsled Team T-17 raon ASRT (whois)
T-8 WOWHacker-BIOS T-18 shell corp
T-9 [Technopandas] T-19 shellphish
T-10 blue lotus T-20 sutegoma2
Deception: In the context of this work we define an attack to be deceptive when multiple
adversaries get mapped to a single attack pattern. In the current setting we define deception
as the scenario when the same exploit is used by multiple teams to target the same team.
Fig. 2.1 shows the distribution of unique deception attacks with respect to the total unique
attacks in the dataset based on the target team. These unique deceptive attacks amount to
just under 35% of the total unique attacks.
Duplicate attacks: A duplicate attack occurs when the same team uses the same payload to
attack a team at different time instances. Duplicate attacks can be attributed to two reasons.
First when a team is trying to compromise other system, it just does not launch a single
attack but a wave of attacks with very little time difference between consecutive attacks.
Second, once a successful payload is created which can penetrate the defense of other
systems, it is used more by the original attacker as well as the deceptive one as compared to
other payloads. We group duplicates as being non-deceptive and deceptive. Non-deceptive
15
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Fig. 2.1: Unique deceptive attacks directed towards each team
duplicate are the duplicates of the team that first initiated the use of a particular payload.
On the other hand deceptive duplicates are all the attacks from the teams that are being
deceptive. Deceptive duplicates form a large portion of the dataset as seen in Fig. 2.2.
Analyzing the number of teams that use a particular payload, gives us insights into the
deceptive behavior of teams. We plot the usage of unique payloads with respect to the
number of teams using them in their attacks. We use 4 different categories namely payloads
used by a single team, payloads used by two teams, payloads used by three teams and
payloads used by more than three teams. Fig. 2.3 shows the plot for each target team. A
large fraction of unique payloads fall in the first two categories (one team and two teams).
2.3 Baseline Approaches
From the dataset we have the ground truth available for all the samples. Hence we use
supervised machine learning approaches to predict the attacking team. The ground truth
corresponds to a team mentioned in Table 2.2.
Decision Tree (DT). For baseline comparisons we first implemented a decision tree classifier.
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This hierarchical recursive partitioning algorithm is widely used for classification problems.
We built the decision tree by finding the attribute that maximizes information gain at each
split. This attribute is termed as the best split attribute and is used to split the node. Higher
the information gain , the more pure the nodes that are split will be. During the testing phase,
we check the test sample for the presence or absence of the best split attribute at each node
till we reach the leaf node. The team that has majority samples at the leaf node, is predicted
as the attack team for the test sample. In order to avoid over-fitting we terminate the tree,
when the number of samples in the node are less than 0.1% of the training data.
Random Forest (RF). Random forest is an ensemble method proposed by Breiman [18]. It
is based on the idea of generating multiple predictors which are then used in combination
to classify unseen samples. The strength of random forest lies in injecting randomness to
build each classifier and using random low dimensional subspaces to split the data at each
node in a classifier. We use a random forest which combines bagging [18] for each tree
with random feature selection [17] at each node to split the data thus generating multiple
decision tree classifiers. To split the data at each node we use information gain with random
subspace projection. The information gain indicates the amount of purity in the node with
respect to class labels. More pure nodes result in higher information gain. Hence we try to
find the splits that maximize the information gain. The advantage of using random forest
over a single decision tree is low variance and the notion that weak learners when combined
together have a strong predictive power. During the test phase , each test sample gets a
prediction from each individual decision tree (weak learner) giving its own opinion on test
sample. The final decision is made by a majority vote among those trees.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). Support vector machines is a popular supervised classi-
fication technique proposed by Vapnik [30]. SVM’s works by finding a separating margin
that maximizes the geometric distance between classes. The separating margin is termed as
a hyperplane. We use the popular LibSVM implementation [25] which is publicly available.
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Fig. 2.4: Team prediction accuracy for LOG-REG, RF, SVM and DT.
SVM is inherently a binary classifier, and it deals with multi-class classification problems
by implementing several 1-vs-1 or 1-vs-all binary classifiers which adds to the complexity
as the number of classes increases.
Logistic Regression (LOG-REG). Logistic regression classifies samples by computing the
odds ratio. The odds ratio gives the strength of association between the features and the class.
As opposed to linear regression , the output of logistic regression is the class probability of
the sample belonging to that class. We implement the multinomial logistic regression which
handles multi-class classification.
2.3.1 Experimental Results
For our baseline experiments, we separate the attacks based on the team being targeted.
Thus we have 20 attack datasets. We then sort the attack according to time. We reserve the
first 90% of the attacks for training and the remaining 10% for testing. Attacker prediction
accuracy is used as the performance measure for the experiment. Accuracy is defined as the
fraction of correctly classified test samples. Fig. 2.4 shows the accuracy for predicting the
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attacker for each target team. Machine learning techniques significantly outperform random
guessing which would have an average accuracy of choosing 1 out of 19 teams attacking
yielding an accuracy of 0.053. For this experiment random forest classifier performs better
than logistic regression, support vector machine and decision tree for all the target teams.
Table 2.3 below summarizes the average performance for each method.
Table 2.3: Summary of Prediction results averaged across all Teams for baseline models.
Method Average Performance
Decision tree (DT) 0.26
Logistic regression (LOG-REG) 0.31
Support vector machine (SVM) 0.30
Random Forest (RF) 0.37
2.3.2 Misclassified Samples
Misclassification can be attributed to the following sources,
• Non-deceptive duplicate attacks attributed to one of the deceptive teams.
• Deceptive duplicates attributed to some other deceptive team.
• Payloads that were not encountered during the training phase.
The first two sources of error make up the majority of misclassifications, since a given attack
can be attributed to any of the 19 teams.
Fig. 2.5 shows the distribution of the above mentioned sources of misclassification
for each team. Deceptive duplicates form the majority of misclassifications. This is not
surprising given the fact that deceptive duplicates make up almost 90% of the total attacks
(see Fig. 2.2).
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Fig. 2.5: Sources of error in the misclassified samples.
2.3.3 Average Prediction Probability
Fig. 2.6 shows the average probability of correctly classified and misclassified samples.
The reported average probabilities are from the random forest classifier which performs the
best among the baseline approaches (see Table 2.3). To compute this average probability we
look at the predicted probability for each test sample rather than the prediction. For random
forest the predicted probability is the average of individual decision trees in the forest. It
is clear that the classifier predicts the correct team with higher probability as opposed to
misclassified samples which are predicted with less confidence (probability).
2.4 Pruning
We explore different pruning techniques to address misclassification issues with respect
to deceptive and non-deceptive duplicates. The pruning techniques are only applied to the
training data, while the test data is maintained at 10% as mentioned in Section 2.3.1. We
use the random forest classifier for all the pruning techniques.
These pruning techniques are briefly described as follows,
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Fig. 2.6: Average Prediction probability for correctly classified and misclassified samples.
• All-but-majority: In this pruning we only consider the duplicates of the most attacking
team given a payload and prune other duplicates.
• All-but-K-majority: Only consider the duplicates of the top K most frequent attacks
given a payload and prunes the rest of the duplicates.
• All-but-earliest-majority: We only retain the duplicates of the team that initiates the
attack given a payload, rest all duplicates are pruned.
• All-but-most-recent-majority: In this pruning we retain the duplicates of the team that
last used the payload in the training data, rest all duplicates are pruned.
Table 2.4 gives the summary of the prediction results for all the pruning techniques in
comparison with the random forest baseline approach. In the pruning techniques All-but-K-
majority works best with an average accuracy of 0.42.
All-but-majority (P-1): In this pruning technique, for each payload, we only retain dupli-
cates of the most frequent attacking team and prune the duplicates of all other teams. This
pruned set is then used to train the random forest classifier. Table 2.5 shows the classifier
22
Table 2.4: Summary of Prediction results averaged across all Teams using pruning tech-
niques.
Method Average Performance
Baseline Approach (RF) 0.37
All-but-majority Pruning (RF) 0.40
All-but-K-majority Pruning (RF) 0.42
All-but-earliest Pruning (RF) 0.34
All-but-most-recent Pruning (RF) 0.36
performance in comparison with the baseline method. All-but-majority pruning technique
has better performance on the test set than the baseline approach for 11 out of 20 teams.
Using this pruning technique does benefit majority of the teams as the prediction accuracy
improves for them, but for some teams the performance drops. The reason for the drop in
performance for some teams is due to the fact that training set gets dominated by a single
team which does not have majority in testing set. Since the majority team gets represented
in most of the leaves of the random forest classifier, it gets predicted more often leading to
high misclassifications.
All-but-K-majority (P-2): In order to address the issue of one team dominating in the
training set, we use the all-but-K-majority where we consider the K most frequent teams for
a payload under consideration. After trying out different values of K we select K = 3, which
gives the best performance. For higher values of K, the pruning behaves like the baseline
approach and for lower values it behaves like All-but-majority. On average each team gains
about 40K samples in the training set as compared to all-but-majority pruning. Table 2.5
shows the classifier performance. In this case also pruning performs better than baseline in
11 out of 20 teams, but as compared to all-but-majority the performance for most teams is
better.
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All-but-earliest (P-3): For this pruning we only retain the duplicates of the team that
initiated the attack using a particular payload. This pruning technique retains all the non-
deceptive duplicates while getting rid of the deceptive ones. Table 2.5 shows the classifier
performance. This pruning technique performs better than the baseline approach for 8 out of
20 teams. Comparing this result to all-but-majority (including all-but-K-majority) pruning
indicates that deceptive duplicates are informative in attributing an attack to a team and
should not be ignored completely.
All-but-most-recent (P-4): In this pruning we repeat a similar procedure like All-but-
earliest but instead of retaining the duplicates of the team that initiated an attack, we retain
the duplicates of the team that used the payload last in the training set. Because the data is
sorted according to time, the last attacker becomes the most recent attacker for the test set.
Table 2.5 shows the classifier performance.
2.4.1 Discussion
On further analysis of the misclassified samples from all-but-earliest and all-but-most-
recent provides an interesting observation. Though majority of the misclassified samples
between the two pruning techniques are similar, there is a fraction of samples which were
correctly classified by all-but-earliest but misclassified by all-but-most-recent and vice versa.
Let first (correct) denote the number of samples that were correctly classified from the
misclassified samples of all-but-most-recent majority pruning experiment. Similarly last
(correct) be the samples that were correctly classified from the misclassified samples of
all-but-earliest majority pruning technique. Fig. 2.7 shows the number of samples that
all-but-earliest pruning was able to classify correctly that were misclassified by all-but-
most-recent. Fig. 2.8 shows a similar result for the other case. For both cases the correctly
classified samples make up around 5-10% of the misclassified samples for each team. This
result shows that using the two pruning techniques together to make attribution decision,
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Table 2.5: Pruning technique performance comparison for each team.
Teams RF P-1(RF) P-2(RF) P-3(RF) P-4(RF)
T-1 0.45 0.16 0.46 0.15 0.15
T-2 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.15 0.14
T-3 0.30 0.53 0.29 0.57 0.57
T-4 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.32
T-5 0.26 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.42
T-6 0.50 0.27 0.24 0.31 0.26
T-7 0.45 0.59 0.58 0.19 0.49
T-8 0.42 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.55
T-9 0.41 0.65 0.68 0.52 0.53
T-10 0.30 0.54 0.34 0.55 0.57
T-11 0.37 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.29
T-12 0.24 0.37 0.37 0.25 0.22
T-13 0.35 0.27 0.37 0.29 0.27
T-14 0.42 0.27 0.40 0.30 0.30
T-15 0.30 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.20
T-16 0.42 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.31
T-17 0.43 0.45 0.35 0.43 0.40
T-18 0.48 0.39 0.43 0.41 0.40
T-19 0.41 0.65 0.58 0.54 0.60
T-20 0.48 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17
would lead to higher performance as opposed to using only one.
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Fig. 2.7: Samples correctly classified by all-but-earliest and not by all-but-most-recent.
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Fig. 2.8: Samples correctly classified by all-but-most-recent and not by all-but-earliest.
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2.4.2 Ensemble Classifier
As discussed earlier using pruning techniques together would improve the prediction
accuracy as opposed to using the pruning techniques individually. We perform an ex-
periment to demonstrate it. We generate one prediction from each of the three pruning
techniques namely, all-but-K-majority (since this pruning technique performs better than all-
but-majority), all-but-earliest and all-but-most-recent. We call these predictions candidates
for being the most likely attackers. We then define conditions to predict the actual attacker
as follows:
1. Predict the team that satisfies atleast two pruning cases.
2. If all the attacking candidates are different, then predict the all-but-K-majority predic-
tion.
Table 2.6 shows the results of this ensemble framework in comparison with the baseline
approach and the different pruning techniques. The results are averaged across all teams.
This 3-candidate ensemble framework performs the best with an average accuracy of 0.46
better than all the approaches indicating that using the pruning techniques in conjunction
with each other improves the prediction accuracy.
2.5 Related Work
In our text on cyber-warfare [113], we discuss the difficulties of cyber-attribution and
how an intelligence analyst must also explore the deception hypothesis in a cyber-warfare
scenario. When compared to other domains of warfare, there is a much greater potential for
evidence found in the aftermath of cyber-attack to be planted by the adversary for purposes
of deception. The policy implications of cyber-attribution have also been discussed in [129]
where the authors point out that anonymity, ability to launch multi-stage attacks, and attack
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Table 2.6: Summary of Prediction results averaged across all Teams for ensemble classifier.
Method Average Performance
Baseline Approach (RF) 0.37
All-but-majority Pruning (RF) 0.40
All-but-K-majority Pruning (RF) 0.42
All-but-earliest Pruning (RF) 0.34
All-but-most-recent Pruning (RF) 0.36
3-Candidate ensemble model (RF) 0.46
speed pose significant challenges to cyber attribution.
In an early survey on cyber-attribution [14], the authors point out that technical attribution
will generally identify machines, as opposed to a given hacker and his/her affiliations. While
we will use technical information in our approach, we have ground truth data on the group
involved by the nature of the capture-the-flag data. This will allow our approach to profile the
tactics, techniques, and procedures of a given group as we have ground-truth information on
a hacking group as opposed to machines. An example of such an approach is the WOMBAT
attribution method [34] which attributes behavior to IP sources that are potentially linked
to some root cause determined through a clustering technique. Similarly, other work [126]
combines cluster analysis with a component for multi-criteria decision analysis and studied
an implementation of this approach using honeypot data again, this approach lacks any
ground truth of the actual hacker or hacking group. In other work on attribution [58], the
authors study the problem of attributing abnormal internal behavior to a malicious insider
over the course of an advanced persistent threat (APT) a different type of attribution problem
than the one we propose to study. Outside of cyber-security, attribution has also been studied
in other contexts. Of particular note is the work of Walls [132]. Here, the author look
at attribution based on forensic information in a much different problem. They consider
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diverse sources, but do not seek to overcome inconsistency caused by intentional deception
nor do they apply their methods to cyber-attacks. More recently the Q model has been
proposed [102]. The framework of the Q model works by letting the analyst ask a range
of relevant questions both technical and non-technical to aid in his process of attributing
the attack. It provides a theoretical map towards cyber-attribution but does not address the
issues of deception and does not evaluate the model on a relevant dataset.
Concurrently, we have devised a formal logical framework for reasoning about cyber-
attribution [56, 114]. However, we have not studied how this framework can be instantiated
on a real world dataset and, to date, we have not reported on an implementation or experi-
ments in the literature.
We note that none of the previous work on cyber-attribution leverages a data set with
ground truth information of actual hacker groups – which is the main novelty of this work.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we study cyber-attribution by examining DEFCON CTF data - which
provides us with ground-truth on the culprit responsible for each attack. We frame cyber-
attribution as a classification problem and examine it using several machine learning ap-
proaches. We find that deceptive incidents account for the vast majority of misclassified
samples. Moving forward in Chapter 3, we look to employ a more principled approach to
counter deception based on our previously established theoretical framework for reasoning
about cyber-attribution [114]. In particular we wish to employ temporal reasoning to tackle
the problem of deceptive attacks. This opens up interesting research questions in particular
identifying hacking group from a series of attacks over a period of time, differentiating
between deceptive hacking groups in time series data. This is a knowledge engineering
challenge which calls for development of efficient and scalable reasoning framework.
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Chapter 3
ARGUMENTATION MODELS FOR CYBER ATTRIBUTION
3.1 Introduction
A major challenge in cyber-threat analysis is to find the person or the group responsible
for a cyber-attack. This is known as cyber-attribution [113, 22] and it is one of the central
technical and policy challenges in cyber-security. Oftentimes, the evidence collected from
multiple sources provides a contradictory viewpoint, which makes it unclear how the
evidence needs to be combined or reasoned about in order to arrive at a conclusion. This gets
worse in cases of deception, where either an attacker plants false evidence, or the evidence
points to multiple threat actors, leading to uncertainty. In the text on cyber-warfare [113] the
authors discuss the difficulties that an intelligence analyst faces in attributing an attack to a
perpetrator given that deception might have occurred, and how the analyst needs to explore
deception hypotheses under the given attack scenario. To resolve deception the analyst also
needs to consider multiple sources of information—each with its level of confidence—to
provide an adequate explanation for a particular decision made.
However, one of the main hurdles in the study and evaluation of cyber-attribution models
is the lack of datasets with ground truth available regarding the party responsible for the
attack—this has limited the evaluation of previous proposals. To overcome this, we built
and leveraged a dataset from the capture-the-flag event held at DEFCON. In chapter 2, we
used this dataset 1 to study cyber-attribution framed as a multi-class classification problem
to predict the attacker. The machine learning model was able to achieve an accuracy of
37%, struggling in situations of deception, where similar attributes point towards multiple
1https://cysis.engineering.asu.edu/cyber-attribution/
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attackers, as well as on previously unobserved attacks (attacks not encountered in the training
data). We thus require a system that must be able to accomplish several goals, including:
• Reason about evidence in case of deceptive and previously unobserved attacks by
relying on explanations (or arguments) constructed from information in the knowledge
base.
• Integrate machine learning tools, towards a hybrid approach that allows to draw
conclusions based on combinations of pieces of evidence and explanations constructed
from the knowledge base.
• Provide analysts with indications as to how the system arrived at a particular conclu-
sion (in this case the actor responsible for the attack), or why other conclusions were
discarded.
To address these requirements, we have proposed a structured argumentation system that
also integrates machine learning approaches in order to reason about cyber events of interest
and tackle the cyber attribution problem. This is—to the best of our knowledge—the first
line of research that combines a Knowledge Representation (KR) formalism, in the form of
structured argumentation, with machine learning (ML) to address cyber attribution. This
chapter brings together and extends the results of chapter 2, combining the DeLP formalism
with machine learning to significantly improve accuracy. This chapter includes:
• A hybrid KR-ML framework that combines machine learning techniques with defea-
sible argumentation for cyber attribution.
• The construction and analysis of a set of argumentation models built on top of each
other in order to improve the performance of the machine learning model.
• An empirical evaluation of the system on our curated dataset; our experiments show
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Fig. 3.1: Reasoning system
that the hybrid approach achieves a significant accuracy of 64.5%, as compared to
37% achieved by machine learning approaches alone.
• A detailed discussion about the relevance of rules introduced in each of the proposed
argumentation models. The discussion is supported by performance numbers demon-
strating the rules that have the most significant impact on the system’s performance.
3.2 System Overview
Fig. 3.1 gives an overview of the reasoning system we developed; it consists of the
following three main modules:
• Knowledge Base: Stores evidence of previously conducted attacks with the ground
truth of the person/group responsible for the attack—we use this content as the training
data. The data can be of different types, including the tools/softwares used in the
attack, attacker behavior information (including motives for the attack), and so on.
In this chapter, the knowledge base is comprised of all the network traffic captured
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during the capture-the-flag competition. In these competitions there are 20 teams
(see Table 2.2) responsible for conducting cyber attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities
in each other’s system. These 20 teams are responsible for the 10 million attacks
that make up the dataset. Each attack is represented by the attacking team, the target
team, instruction and byte histograms of the exploit used in the attack, as well as the
timestamp of the attack (see Table 2.1). We discuss the dataset and the DEFCON CTF
event in detail in Section 2.2. We sort the dataset by time and divide it according to
target teams listed in Table 2.2. The first 90% is reserved for training (knowledge
base) and the remaining 10% for testing.
• Argumentation Model: This component constructs arguments for a given query
(attack of interest) using elements in the knowledge base. We use a formalism that
combines logic programming with defeasible argumentation (DeLP). It is made up
of three constructs: facts: observations from the knowledge base that cannot be
contradicted; strict rules: logical combinations of facts that are always true; and
defeasible rules: can be thought of as strict rules but are only true if no contradictory
evidence is present. We discuss the argumentation framework with examples for each
of the constructs in Section 3.3. Arguments help reduce the set of possible attackers
behind the attack; this reduced set of possible attackers acts as one of the inputs to
the machine learning model. The argumentation model thus constrains the machine
learning model to predict the attacker from the reduced set of possible attackers.
• Machine learning model: The machine learning model takes the knowledge base and
query as input, along with the reduced set of possible attackers from the argumentation
model, and provides an attacker deemed responsible for the attack. It is constrained
by the argumentation model to select the attacker from the reduced attacker set, which
aids the machine learning model as demonstrated in the results section of the chapter.
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We use the byte and instruction histograms extracted from the exploits used in the
attack as features for the machine learning model. Any standard machine learning
model can be used in this module, based on the type of attack data being analyzed.
Here, we use random forest, which have exhibited the best performance for this
dataset [91].
3.3 Argumentation Model
Our approach relies on a model of the world where we can analyze competing hypotheses
in a cyber-operation scenario. It should allow for contradictory information so it can
handle inconsistency in cases of deception. In his section, we review the necessary ideas
from defeasible logic-based argumentation [42], and provide examples of this approach
instantiated for our cyber attribution problem.
Before describing the argumentation model in detail, we introduce some necessary
notation. Variables and constant symbols represent items such as the exploits/payloads used
for the attack, and the actors conducting the cyber-attack (in this case, the teams in the CTF
competition). We denote the set of all variable symbols with V and the set of all constants
with C. In the running example, we use a subset of our DEFCON CTF dataset. For our
model we require two subsets of C: Cact , denoting the actors capable of conducting the
cyber-operation, and Cexp , denoting the set of unique exploits used. We use strings starting
with capital letters to denote variables.
Example 1. The following are examples of actors and cyber-operations from the CTF data:
Cact = {bluelotus, robotmafia, apt8}, Cexp = {exploit1, exploit2, ..., exploitn}.
The language also contains a set of predicate symbols that have constants or variables as
arguments, and denote events that can be either true or false. A ground atom is composed
by a predicate symbol and a tuple of constants, one for each argument. The set of all ground
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atoms is denoted with G. A ground literal L is a ground atom or a negated ground atom.
An example of a ground atom for our running example is attack(exploit1, bluelotus). We
denote a subset of G with G′. We denote the set of predicates with P.
Example 2. Some examples of predicates are shown in Table 3.1.
For instance, culprit(exploit1, apt8) will either be true or false, and denotes the event where
apt8 used exploit1 to conduct a cyber-operation.
We define deceptive and replay attacks in the context of this work:
Deception: In the context of this work, we define an attack to be deceptive when multiple
adversaries get mapped to an identical exploit. In the current setting we define deception as
the scenario in which the same exploit is used by multiple teams against the same target. In
Table 3.1, deception(exploit1, apt8) denotes the event where apt8 used exploit1 to conduct
a deceptive attack.
Replay attacks: A replay attack occurs when the a team uses the same payload at different
points in time. In Table 3.1, replay attack(E ,Y) denotes the event where exploit E was
replayed by team Y. Replay attacks can be attributed to two reasons. First, when a team is
trying to compromise another’s system, it does not just launch a single attack but rather a
wave of attacks with very little time difference in between consecutive attacks. Second, once
a successful payload is created that can penetrate the defense of other systems, it is used
both by the original attacker as well as the deceptive ones, and it is used in more occasions
compared to other payloads. We group replay attacks as either being non-deceptive or
deceptive. The former are copies of the attacks launched by the team that first initiated the
use of a particular payload; on the other hand, deceptive replay attacks are all the attacks
from the teams that did not initiate the use of a given payload.
We choose a structured argumentation framework [101] for our model; our approach
works by creating arguments (in the form of a set of rules and facts) that compete with each
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Table 3.1: Example Predicates and explanation
Predicate Explanation
attack(exploit1, bluelotus) exploit1 was targeted towards the team Blue Lotus.
replay attack(E ,Y) Exploit E was replayed by team Y.
deception(exploit1, apt8) Team apt8 used exploit1 for deception.
time diff(I, Y) Team Y was deceptive within the given time interval I .
culprit(exploit1, apt8) Team apt8 is the likely culprit for the attack (using
exploit1 on the target team).
other to attribute an attack to a given perpetuator. In this case, arguments are defeated based
on contradicting information in other arguments. This procedure is known as a dialectical
process, where the arguments that are undefeated prevail—such arguments are said to be
warranted, and they give a clear map of what conclusions are adequately supported. This
transparency lets a security analyst not only add new arguments based on new evidence
discovered in the system, but also get rid of incorrect information and fine-tune the model for
better performance. Since the argumentation model can deal with inconsistent information,
it draws a natural analogy to the way humans settle disputes when there is contradictory
information available. Having a clear explanation of why one argument is chosen over
others is a desirable characteristic for both analysts and organizations that need to make
decisions and policy changes.
3.3.1 Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP)
DeLP is a formalism that combines logic programming with defeasible argumentation;
we will now provide a brief introduction, but full details can be found in [42]. The formalism
is made up of several constructs, namely facts, strict rules, and defeasible rules. Facts
represent statements obtained from evidence, and are always true; similarly, strict rules
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are logical combinations of facts that always hold. On the contrary, defeasible rules can
be thought of as strict rules that may be true in some situations, but could be false if
contradictory evidence is present. These three constructs are used to build arguments, and
DeLP programs are sets of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. We use the usual notation
for DeLP programs, denoting the knowledge base with Π = (Θ,Ω,∆), where Θ is the set
of facts, Ω is the set of strict rules, and ∆ is the set of defeasible rules. Examples of the
three constructs are provided with respect to the dataset in Fig. 3.2. We now describe the
constructs in detail.
Facts (Θ) are ground literals that represent atomic information or its (strong) negation (¬).
Strict Rules (Ω) represent cause and effect information; they are of the form L0 ← L1, ...Ln,
where L0 is a literal and {Li}i>0 is a set of literals.
Defeasible Rules (∆) are weaker versions of strict rules, and are of the form L0 -≺
L1, ...., Ln, where L0, is the literal and {Li}i>0 is a set of literals.
When a cyber-attack occurs, the model can be used to derive arguments as to who
could have conducted the attack. Derivation follows the same mechanism as logic program-
ming [73]. DeLP incorporates defeasible argumentation, which decides which arguments
are warranted and it blocks arguments that are in conflict and a winner cannot be determined.
Example 3. Fig. 3.2 shows a ground argumentation framework demonstrating constructs
derived from the CTF data. For instance, θ1 indicates the fact that exploit1 was used to
target the team Blue Lotus, and θ5 indicates that team pwnies is the most frequent user of
exploit1. For the strict rules, ω1 says that for a given exploit1 the attacker is pwnies if it was
the most frequent attacker and the attack exploit1 was replayed. Defeasible rules can be
read similarly; δ2 indicates that exploit1 was used in a deceptive attack by APT8 if it was
replayed and the first attacker was not APT8. By replacing the constants with variables in
the predicates we can derive a non-ground argumentation framework.
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Θ : θ1 = attack(exploit1, bluelotus)
θ2 = first attack(exploit1, robotmafia)
θ3 = last attack(exploit1, apt8))
θ4 = time diff(interval, robotmafia)
θ5 = most frequent(exploit1, pwnies)
Ω : ω1 = culprit(exploit1, pwnies)← most frequent(exploit1, pwnies),
replay attack(exploit1)
ω2 = ¬ culprit(exploit1, robotMafia)← last attack(exploit1, apt8),
replay attack(exploit1)
∆ : δ1 = replay attack(exploit1) -≺ attack(exploit1, bluelotus),
last attack(exploit1, apt8)
δ2 = deception(exploit1, apt8) -≺ replay attack(exploit1),
first attack(exploit1, robotmafia)
δ3 = culprit(exploit1, apt8) -≺ deception(exploit1, apt8),
replay attack(exploit1)
δ4 = ¬culprit(exploit1, apt8) -≺ time diff(interval, robotmafia)
Fig. 3.2: A ground argumentation framework.
Definition 1. (Argument) An argument for a literal L is a pair 〈A, L〉, where A ⊆ Π
provides a minimal proof for L meeting the requirements: (1) L is defeasibly derived from
A 2 , (2) Θ ∪ Ω ∪ A is not contradictory, and (3) A is a minimal subset of ∆ satisfying 1
and 2, denoted 〈A, L〉.
Literal L is called the conclusion supported by the argument, and A is the support. An
2Defeasible derivations are sequences of rules (possibly including defeasible rules) that
end in L.
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〈A1, replay attack(exploit1) 〉 A1 = {δ1, θ1, θ3}
〈A2, deception(exploit1, apt8) 〉 A2 = {δ1, δ2, θ2}
〈A3, culprit(exploit1, apt8)〉 A3 = {δ1, δ2, δ3}
〈A4, ¬culprit(exploit1, apt8)〉 A4 = {δ1, δ4, θ3}
Fig. 3.3: Example ground arguments from Fig. 3.2.
argument 〈B, L〉 is a subargument of 〈A, L′〉 iff B ⊆ A. The following examples show
arguments for our scenario.
Example 4. Fig. 3.3 shows example arguments based on the knowledge base from Fig. 3.2;
here,
〈A1, replay attack(exploit1)〉 is a subargument of 〈A2, deception(exploit1, apt8)〉
and
〈A3, culprit(exploit1, apt8)〉.
For a given argument there may be counter-arguments that contradict it. For instance,
referring to Fig. 3.3, we can see that A4 attacks A3. A proper defeater of an argument
〈A,L〉 is a counter-argument that—by some criterion—is considered to be better than
〈A, L〉; if the two are incomparable according to this criterion, the counterargument is said
to be a blocking defeater. The default criterion used in DeLP for argument comparison is
generalized specificity [119].
A sequence of arguments is called an argumentation line. There can be more than
one defeater argument, which leads to a tree structure that is built from the set of all
argumentation lines rooted in the initial argument. In this dialectical tree, every child can
defeat its parent (except for the root), and the leaves represent the undefeated arguments;
this creates a map of all possible argumentation lines that decide if an argument is defeated
or not. Arguments that either have no attackers or all attackers have been defeated are said
to be warranted.
Given a literal L and an argument
〈A, L〉, in order to decide whether or not a literal
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L is warranted, every node in the dialectical tree T (〈A, L〉) is recursively marked as “D”
(defeated) or “U” (undefeated), obtaining a marked dialectical tree T ∗(〈A, L〉) where:
• All leaves in T ∗(〈A, L〉) are marked “U”, and
• Let 〈B, q〉 be an inner node of T ∗(〈A, L〉). Then, 〈B, q〉 will be marked “U” iff every
child of 〈B, q〉 is marked “D”. Node 〈B, q〉 will be marked “D” iff it has at least one
child marked “U”.
Given argument 〈A, L〉 over Π, if the root of T ∗(〈A, L〉) is marked “U”, then T ∗(〈A, h〉)
warrants L and that L is warranted from Π. (Warranted arguments correspond to those in
the grounded extension of a Dung argumentation system [37].)
In practice, an implementation of DeLP accepts as input sets of facts, strict rules,
and defeasible rules. Note that while the set of facts and strict rules is consistent (non-
contradictory), the set of defeasible rules can be inconsistent. We engineer our cyber-
attribution framework as a set of defeasible and strict rules whose structure was created
manually, but are dependent on values learned from a historical corpus. Then, for a given
incident, we instantiate a set of facts for that situation. This information is then provided
as input into a DeLP implementation that uses heuristics to generate all arguments for and
against every possible culprit for the cyber attack. Dialectical trees based on these arguments
are analyzed, and a decision is made regarding which culprits are warranted. This results in
a reduced set of potential culprits, which we then use as input into a classifier to obtain an
attribution decision.
3.4 Models
We now introduce several DeLP-based models that capture important aspects relating to
cyber attribution and can be instantiated using available data.
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Θ : θ1 = attack (E ,X)
θ2 = first attack (E ,Y)
θ3 = last attack (E ,Y)
Fig. 3.4: Facts defined for each test sample.
3.4.1 Baseline Argumentation Model (BM)
We use the following notation: let E be the attack query under consideration aimed at
target team X, Y represent all the possible attacking teams, and D be the set of all deceptive
teams (those using deceptive attacks) if the given attack is deceptive in the training set. For
non-deceptive attacks, D will be empty. We note that facts cannot have variables, only
constants (however, help compress the program for readability purposes, we use meta-
variables in facts). To begin, we define the facts described in Fig. 3.4; fact θ1 states that
attack E was used to target team X, θ2 states that team Y was the first team to use the attack
E in the training data, and similarly θ3 states that team Y was the last team to use the attack
E in the training data. The first and last attacking team may or may not be the same. We
study the following three cases:
Case 1: Non-deceptive attacks. In non-deceptive attacks, only one team uses the payload
to target other teams in the training data. It is easy to predict the attacker for these cases,
since the search space only has one team. To model this situation, we define a set of
defeasible and strict rules: In Fig. 3.5, defeasible rule δ1 checks whether the attack was
replayed in the training data. Since it is a non-deceptive attack, it is only replayed by the
same team. The strict rule ω1 then puts forth an argument for the attacker (culprit) if the
defeasible rule holds and there is no contradiction for it.
Case 2: Deceptive attacks. These attacks form the majority of the misclassified samples
in previous work [91]. In this case, set D is not empty; let Di denote the deceptive teams
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Ω : ω1 = culprit(E ,Y)← last attack(E ,Y), replay attack(E).
∆ : δ1 = replay attack(E) -≺ attack(E ,X), last attack(E ,Y).
Fig. 3.5: Defeasible and strict rule for non-deceptive attack.
Θ : θ4 = decep(E ,X)
θ5 = frequent (E , F )
Ω : ω2 = ¬culprit(E ,Y)← first attack(E ,Y), decep(E ,X)
∆ : δ2 = replay attack(E) -≺ attack(E ,X), last attack(E ,Y)
δ3 = deception(E ,Di) -≺ replay attack(E), first attack(E ,Y)
δ4 = culprit(E ,Di) -≺ deception(E ,Di), first attack(E ,Y)
Fig. 3.6: Facts and rules for deceptive attacks.
in D. We also compute the most frequent attacker from the training data given a deceptive
attack, and denote it with F . The DeLP components that model this case include the ones
in Fig. 3.6; fact θ4 indicates that attack E was deceptive towards team X, and θ5 indicates
the most frequent attacker team F from the training data. Strict rule ω2 indicates that in
case of deception the first attack team Y is not the attacker. For the defeasible rules, δ2 deals
with the case in which attack E was replayed, δ3 deals with the case of deceptive teams from
the set D, and δ4 indicates that all the deceptive teams are likely to be the attackers in the
absence of any contradictory information.
Case 3: Previously Unseen Attacks. The most difficult attacks to attribute in the dataset
are the new ones, which are attacks first encountered in the test set (i.e., those that did not
occur in the training set). To build constructs for this kind of attack we first compute the k
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nearest neighbors from the training set according to a simple Euclidean distance between
the byte and instruction histograms of the two attacks. For each of the matching attacks
from the training data we check if the attack is deceptive or non-deceptive. If non-deceptive,
we follow the procedure for Case 1, otherwise we follow the procedure for Case 2. Since we
replace one unseen attack with three seen attacks, the search space for the attacker increases
in these cases.
Attacker Time Analysis
The CTF data provides us with time stamps for the attacks in the competition. We can use
this information to come up with rules for/against an argument for a team being the attacker.
We compute the average time for a team to replay its own attack given that it was the first
one to deploy it (see Fig. 3.7). It can be observed that teams like more smoked leet chicken
(T-13) and Wowhacker-bios (T-8) are very quick to replay their own attacks as compared to
other teams. Fig. 3.7 also shows the average time for a team to perform a deceptive attack.
Teams like The European (T-7) and Blue lotus (T-10) are quick to commit deception, while
others take more time.
We use this time information to narrow down our search space for possible attackers. In
particular, for a deceptive attack query, we compute the time difference between the query
and the training sample that last used the same payload. We denote this time difference
as 4t, and include it as a fact θ6. We then divide the deceptive times from Fig. 3.7 into
appropriate intervals; each team is assigned to one of those time intervals. We then check
which time interval4t belongs to and define a defeasible rule δ5 that makes a case that all
teams not belonging to the interval are not the culprits, as shown in Fig. 3.8.
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Fig. 3.7: Average time for teams to perform a deceptive attack and replay own attacks
(Log-scale).
Θ : θ6 = timedifference (E ,X)
For Y /∈ interval:
∆ : δ5 = ¬culprit(E ,Y) -≺ timedifference (E ,X).
Fig. 3.8: Time facts and rules. Interval indicates a small portion of the entire deceptive time
(for instance, less than 2, 000 seconds, more than 8, 000 seconds, and so on).
3.4.2 Extended Baseline Argumentation Model I (EB1)
Previously unseen attacks make up almost 20% of the test samples for each target team.
On analyzing the misclassification from the baseline argumentation model, we observe that
the majority of these attacks get misclassified (>80%).
The misclassifications can be attributed to two main reasons: first, the reduced search
space is not able to capture the ground truth for unseen attacks (i.e., the actual attacker is
not present in the reduced search space), which leads to a wrong decision by the learning
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model; second, since we represent each unseen attack by the k most similar attacks from the
training data, this leads to an increase in the size of the search space—the presence of more
choices for the learning model makes it more difficult to make the correct choice [94].
We address these issues by leveraging two sets of defeasible rules. First, for each target
team we compute from the training set the top three teams that come up with the most
unique exploits, as these teams are more likely to launch an unseen attack in the test set.
The intuition behind this rule is that not all teams write their own exploits—most teams just
capture a successful exploit launched by other teams and repackage it and use it as their own
(deception). The second set of rules is proposed to avoid addition of less similar teams to
the reduced search space. In the baseline model we use 3-nearest neighbors to represent an
unseen attack; in this extended version, we consider only the nearest neighbors that are less
than a particular threshold value T (set for each target team separately). So, each attack will
be represented by k ≤ 3 teams depending upon the threshold requirement. Apart from the
baseline model rules, we propose additional rules for deceptive attacks. Let U denote the
set of teams with the three highest numbers of unique attacks in the training data. Also, let
N denote the set of three most similar culprits for the given unseen attack. The extended
model is shown in Fig. 3.9; fact θ7 indicates the teams present in N and whose similarity is
less than a particular threshold T , while θ8 indicates if the team ui was one of most unique
attackers from set U . For the defeasible rules, δ6 follows fact θ7, stating that the teams in N
that satisfy the threshold condition are likely to be the culprits, and δ7 indicates that if ui is a
unique attacker then it can be the culprit unless contradictory information is available. U is
independent of the test samples and will be the same for all previously unseen attacks given
a target team.
For each of the similar payloads (three or fewer) computed from the training data we
check if the attack is deceptive or non-deceptive. If non-deceptive, we follow the procedure
for Case 1, otherwise we follow the procedure for Case 2 stated in the baseline argumentation
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model.
For (ni ∈ N and sim < T ):
Θ : θ7 = threshold(E , T )
For ui in U :
θ8 = unique(E , ui)
∆ : δ6 = culprit(E , ni) -≺ threshold(E , T )
For ui ∈ U :
δ7 = culprit(E , ui) -≺ unique(E , ui)
Fig. 3.9: Rules for unseen attacks.
3.4.3 Extended Baseline Argumentation Model II (EB2)
Another source of misclassification in the baseline argumentation model is the presence
of previously unseen deceptive teams and their replayed attacks. These refer to teams that
did not use the exploit in the training set but started using it in the test set. It is difficult
for a machine learning approach to pinpoint such a team as being the culprit if it has not
encountered it using the exploit in the past. In our dataset, these attacks comprise 15% of
the total, and up to 20% for some target teams.
In order to address this issue, we group together teams that have similar deceptive
behavior based on the time information available to us from the training set; for instance,
teams that are deceptive within a certain interval of time (e.g., less than 2,000 seconds) after
the first attack has been played are grouped together. For a given attack query, we compute
the time difference between the query and the last time the attack was used in the training
set. We then assign this time difference to a specific group based on which interval the
time difference falls in. In order to fine-tune the time intervals, instead of using the average
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Θ : θ9 = timedifference (E ,X)
For Y ∈ interval:
∆ : δ8 = culprit(E ,Y) -≺ timedifference (E ,X).
Fig. 3.10: Time facts and rules. Interval indicates a small portion of the entire deceptive
time (for instance, less than 2, 000 seconds, more than 8, 000 seconds, and so on).
deceptive times averaged across all target teams (as used in the baseline model), we compute
and use deceptive times for each target team separately. We model the time rules as stated in
Fig. 3.10; fact θ9 states the time difference between the query and the last training sample to
use that attack. The defeasible rule δ8 on the other hand states that teams belonging to that
interval (in which the time difference lies) are likely to be the culprits unless a contradiction
is present. It is clear that this rule will increase the search space for the query, as additional
teams are now being added as likely culprits (see Table 3.11).
3.4.4 Extended Baseline Argumentation Model III (EB3)
We now describe a third approach to address misclassifications. In EB1, we try to
address the issue by introducing rules that include additional teams in the reduced search
space given their ability to create unique exploits and not mimic other teams. In EB2,
similarly behaving teams are added to the search space based on the time rules to tackle
unseen attacks. The rules constructed in the previous proposed models are with respect to a
particular query, and do not incorporate the behavior of the attacking team towards different
target teams irrespective of the query.
Analyzing the attack patterns for each team in the CTF event (using the knowledge
base), preferred target teams for each team can be identified. Preferred teams have large
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amounts of attacks directed towards them from a single team; this is not surprising given
that technical expertise differs from team to team. Teams might find themselves target of a
large number of attacks if they are not able to find the system vulnerabilities quickly and
patch them up. Since teams have access to the network traffic at all times, they can identify
vulnerable teams based on the network traffic directed towards any team. We leverage this
information by identifying the teams that are responsible for a majority of the attacks given
a target team. From this set we select teams based on a threshold set to more than 20%
of the total attacks. We used different threshold values and selected 20%, as reducing the
threshold adds more teams without improving the performance, resulting in a larger reduced
search space and a degradation of the performance for some target teams. We denote this set
as F , and the threshold as λ.
In the above-discussed time based rules, teams are blocked as being the likely attackers if
the attack time difference for the teams falls outside the defined interval (see Fig. 3.8). This
leads to eliminations of some of the deceptive teams that could have been the likely culprit.
We construct defeasible rules by combining the time based rules with teams identified
as preferred attackers for a given target team. The rules are similar to Fig. 3.8, with an
additional condition added to not block the team if it is one of the preferred attackers for the
target team.
Fig. 3.11 shows the updated time rules. We first compute the time difference between
the query and the training sample that last used the same payload (denoted as 4t), and
include it as a fact θ10. Preferred attackers for the given target team X are then computed that
satisfy the given threshold condition; this is represented as fact θ11. We divide the deceptive
times from Fig. 3.7 into appropriate intervals; each team is assigned to one of those time
intervals. Then, we check which time interval4t belongs to, and define a defeasible rule δ9
that makes a case for all teams not belonging to the interval to not be the culprits given that
the team is not from the preferred attacker set F .
48
Θ : θ10 = timedifference (E ,X)
Θ : θ11 = pref attacker(X, λ)
For Y /∈ interval and Y /∈ in F :
∆ : δ9 = ¬culprit(E ,Y) -≺ timedifference (E ,X).
Fig. 3.11: Time facts and rules. Interval indicates a small portion of the entire deceptive
time (for instance, at most 2, 000 seconds, at least 8, 000 seconds, and so on), and F is the
preferred attacker set for a given target team X.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
We now report on the results of a series of experiments that we run in order to evaluate
our proposed methodology. The dataset was discussed in chapter 2 (see Section 2.2).
3.5.1 Results
Table 3.2 shows the comparison of the four proposed models (baseline plus the three
extended argumentation models) with respect to the reduced search space and the fraction
that of the reduced search space that contain the ground truth. We observe that for EB3 the
search space is increased by an average of almost 3.7 teams per test sample from EB1; at
the same time the presence of ground truth in the reduced search space increased to 0.83,
which is a significant improvement over 0.68.
Baseline Argumentation Model (BM)
We now provide a summary of the experimental results—the setup is similar to chapter 2:
the dataset is sorted by time for each target team, the first 90% of the data is used for training
and the remaining 10% for testing. The constructs for all test samples based on the cases
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Models for reduced search space
Average BM EB1 EB2 EB3
Average number of teams in the reduced
search space
6.07 5.025 7.518 8.79
Reduced search space with ground truth 0.66 0.68 0.78 0.83
discussed in the previous section are computed, and these arguments are used as input to the
DeLP argumentation framework. For each test sample the DeLP system is queried to find all
possible attackers (culprits) based on the arguments provided. If there is no way to decide
between contradicting arguments, these are blocked and thus return no answers. Initially,
the search space for each test sample is 19 teams (all except the one being attacked).
After running the queries to return the set of possible culprits, the average search space
across all target teams is 6.07 teams. This is a significant reduction in search space across all
target teams; to gauge how much the reduced search space can aid an analyst in predicting
the actual culprit, a metric is computed that checks if the reduced search space contains the
ground truth (actual culprit). For all the target teams, the ground truth is present on average
in almost 66% of the samples with reduced search space. For some teams like more smoked
leet chicken (T-13) and raon ASRT (whois) (T-17) the average reduced search space is as
low as 1.82 and 2.9 teams, with high ground truth fractions of 0.69 and 0.63, respectively.
Analysis is then performed on the reduced search space to derive a culprit. The experi-
mental setup is similar to the one described earlier; the only difference this time is instead of
having a 19 team search space as in chapter 2, the machine learning approach is allowed to
make a prediction from the reduced search space only; a random forest is used for learning,
which has been shown to have the best performance on this data as reported in chapter 2.
The accuracy achieved after running Random forest without applying the argumentation-
based techniques, as reported in chapter 2, is 0.37. This was the best performing approach
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using standard machine learning techniques. The baseline model achieves an average
accuracy of 0.5, already a significantly improvement.
Extended Baseline Argumentation Model I (EB1)
We used the same experimental setup discussed in the baseline argumentation model. EB1
performs slightly better than the baseline model with an average accuracy of 0.53 vs. 0.50,
and significantly better than the machine learning model without argumentation (accuracy
of 0.37). The improvement in performance is due to the fact that we have a larger fraction of
reduced search spaces with ground truth present in it; also, the search space reduced from on
average 6.07 teams to 5.025 teams, thus having a better chance at finding the right solution.
Extended Baseline Argumentation Model II (EB2)
Again, we used the same experimental setup to evaluate this model; we also report the
fraction that the ground truth is present in the reduced search space to give an intuition
regarding the performance of the prediction model. In Table 3.3, we can see that EB2
obtained an average accuracy of 62%. The addition of teams based on time rules not only
benefits detection of previously unseen deceptive teams, but it also helps in predicting
attackers for previously unseen attacks. The major reason for the jump in performance is
that in many queries with unseen deceptive teams, the time rules proposed in the baseline
model block all deceptive teams from being the culprit, leading to an empty set of culprits.
The new set of time rules proposed in EB2 adds similar-behaving teams to this set based on
time information; the learning algorithm is then able to predict the right one from this set.
Accuracies for each target team are reported in Table 3.4.
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Extended Baseline Argumentation Model III (EB3)
We evaluate the last extended baseline model (EB3) using the same experimental setup. In
Table 3.3, EB3 performs the best with an average prediction accuracy of 64.5%—Table 3.4
gives the performance for each target team. The conditional time rules benefit 7 out of
20 teams by retaining the actual culprit in the search space, which is then selected by the
machine learning model. The retention is not always beneficial, since in 9 cases the accuracy
does not change from EB2 to EB3. On the other hand, in 4 cases the performance degrades.
The reason for the improvement in overall accuracy is due to the retention of the preferred
attacker set for target teams that contain the actual attacker. This is observed in the fact that
for EB3 the fraction of ground truth present in the reduced search space increases to 83% as
compared to 78% for EB2 (see Table 3.3). Also, the average reduced search space increases
from 7.518 teams to 8.79 teams, as more teams are retained due to the conditional time
rules.
Table 3.3: Average accuracy comparison of proposed models
Average BM EB1 EB2 EB3
Reduced search space with ground truth 0.66 0.68 0.78 0.83
Accuracy 0.50 0.53 0.62 0.645
3.5.2 Rule relevance discussion
We now study and discuss the relevance of different rules introduced to address the three
test cases, namely non-deceptive, deceptive, and previously unseen attacks.
Case 1: Non-deceptive attacks. For these attacks, the search space only has one team,
which is chosen as the culprit (see Fig. 3.5). We define a simple rule that adds the only team
that used that exploit as the likely culprit. On average, the non-deceptive attacks make up
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Table 3.4: Results Summary
Team ML (chapter 2) BM EB1 EB2 EB3
T-1 0.45 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.58
T-2 0.22 0.45 0.38 0.43 0.50
T-3 0.30 0.40 0.47 0.66 0.68
T-4 0.26 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.48
T-5 0.26 0.45 0.45 0.56 0.60
T-6 0.5 0.49 0.55 0.70 0.70
T-7 0.45 0.53 0.56 0.66 0.64
T-8 0.42 0.61 0.58 0.74 0.74
T-9 0.41 0.50 0.53 0.76 0.76
T-10 0.30 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.46
T-11 0.37 0.44 0.5 0.73 0.71
T-12 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.52 0.56
T-13 0.35 0.63 0.64 0.75 0.75
T-14 0.42 0.52 0.53 0.67 0.67
T-15 0.30 0.38 0.55 0.64 0.67
T-16 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.65 0.65
T-17 0.42 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.68
T-18 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.65 0.63
T-19 0.41 0.51 0.56 0.68 0.68
T-20 0.48 0.51 0.64 0.71 0.71
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almost 5% of the total test attacks for each target team. On the other hand, the accuracy
of choosing the attacker on average for each target team is 67%. Thus, the simple rule
engineered for the non-deceptive case works well in determining the attacker for 67% of
the time. The misclassified 33% make up a very small portion of the total misclassified test
attacks. The reason for misclassification is that the non-deceptive attack becomes deceptive
in the test set when a new team starts using the exploit. It is a difficult case for attacker
selection, since it requires the framework to predict if a particular test case will become
deceptive in the future based on the evidence from the knowledge base. No new rules are
introduced for the non-deceptive case for any of the proposed extended models.
Case 2: Deceptive attacks. Initially, for deceptive attacks the search space was comprised
of all the teams that had used the exploit in the knowledge base (see Fig. 3.6). The deceptive
attacks (including deceptive replayed attacks) make up to almost 80% of the test attacks for
each target team. Below we discuss the rules introduced for deceptive attacks for each of
the proposed models, and how they affect the accuracy of the solutions.
• BM: The baseline model introduces time rules that eliminate teams from the culprit
set if the time difference since the last attack does not fall in a certain time bucket
(see Fig. 3.8). With these time rules, the average accuracy for each target team for
the deceptive attacks is 54%. Misclassification is attributed to two main factors: first,
the defined time rules are not able to capture the ground truth (i.e., they eliminate the
actual culprit from the culprit set); second, the classification model not able to make
the right prediction.
• EB1: In this baseline model, rules were introduced to address the misclassification for
previously unseen attacks, without any new rules added for deceptive attacks; hence,
the classification performance is the same as for BM.
• EB2: In some cases, the time rules proposed in the BM result in the elimination
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of all the teams in the culprit set, thus returning an empty set for the classification
model to choose from. Also, since the test attack is already classified as deceptive,
teams not using the exploit in the knowledge base might adopt it in the test set. To
address both these issues, we introduced additional time rules (see Fig. 3.10) that add
similar-behaving teams to the culprit set. In this case the similar behavior represents
teams that have similar deceptive attack times. The new time rules solve the issue of
the empty culprit set, at the same time adding teams that might adopt the deceptive
behavior in the test set. This leads to a significant performance improvement for the
deceptive test attacks, boosting the accuracy from 54% to 64%. The performance
boost indicates that new teams often adopt deceptive behavior in the test set.
• EB3: The time rules proposed above either eliminate teams from the culprit set or
they add to it. The new model proposed here introduces conditional time rules where
the elimination of teams is subject to whether they belong to the preferred attacker
set or not for the particular target team (see Fig. 3.11). It is the only proposed model
where contradiction is resolved by looking at the ordering of rules, deciding which
rule has priority. In this case the preferred attacker set is given preference, as teams
often target teams that they feel are easy to exploit since the team is not quick enough
to patch discovered vulnerabilities. This is observed in the knowledge base for each of
the target teams. Introduction of these new rules improves the accuracy of deceptive
attacks slightly to just under 65%, indicating that rule ordering has some impact.
Case 3: Previously unseen attacks. The attacks not observed in the knowledge base are
termed are referred to as previously unseen attacks, and they comprise almost 15% of
the test attacks for each target team. The rules introduced for these attacks are either the
ones introduced for the deceptive or the non-deceptive case, depending on the computed
similar exploits for a given unseen test attack. So any performance improvement due to the
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introduction of additional deceptive rules will benefit the unseen attacks as well. We do a
similar comparison of the models proposed for unseen attacks as done for the deceptive
ones.
• BM: In the baseline model, for the unseen attacks we compute the three most similar
exploits from the knowledge base, and then categorize the exploit as deceptive or
non-deceptive; rules are computed accordingly. The average accuracy for the unseen
attack for this model is 30%, so unseen attacks are often misclassified. The main
reasons are that the rules are not able to capture the actual attacking team; also, the
rule of computing similar exploits assumes that similar exploits will be authored by
the same team, which is not true in many cases. Hence, an expansion of the rules for
previously unseen attacks is required.
• EB1: Two rules are proposed for previously unseen attacks in EB1 (see Fig. 3.9).
The first rule computes the number of similar exploits to be used based on similarity
threshold. Hence, the number of similar exploits varies for each unseen attack and
is not fixed to 3 as in the case of BM. The second rule is designed on the basis that
not all teams have similar technical capabilities. Some teams design new exploits
throughout the competition, while others monitor the network and capture and use
exploits designed by other teams most of the time. Therefore, when a new exploit is
encountered in the test set, it is very likely that it comes from a team that has a history
of designing new exploits. We thus introduce a rule that computes the three newest
exploit designers for a given target team and adds them to the set of culprits. These
two rules significantly boost the previously unseen attack performance from 30% to
44%, indicating their relevance.
• EB2: Here, time rules are introduced to add similar-behaving teams to the culprit
set. These rules had a significant performance boost for the deceptive attacks. Since
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previously unseen attacks can also be deceptive, a similar performance improvement
was observed. The average accuracy of EB2 increases from 44% to 52% for previously
unseen attacks.
• EB3: The performance for EB3 has a trend similar to EB2’s. The introduced con-
ditional time rules benefit deceptive attacks, improving the average accuracy for
previously unseen attacks to 55%.
Table 3.5 summarizes the results for the three test cases for all the proposed models. It
can be observed that time rules proposed in EB2 have the most significant performance boost
for deceptive attacks; on the other hand, the threshold-based rules and the rules to compute
the teams responsible for designing the most unique exploits have the most significant
performance boost for previously unseen attacks.
Table 3.5: Comparison of Models for the three test cases
Average Accuracy BM EB1 EB2 EB3
Non-deceptive attacks 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Deceptive attacks 0.54 0.54 0.64 0.65
Unseen attacks 0.30 0.44 0.52 0.55
3.6 Related Work
This chapter builds upon our own recent application of argumentation to cyber attri-
bution [56] and our preliminary study on applying machine learning models for cyber
attribution in the presence of deception as reported in chapter 2. In chapter 2, only machine
learning techniques were leveraged on the CTF data to identify the attacker—we will now
provide a summary of the results obtained. The experiment was performed as follows: the
dataset was divided according to the target team, building 20 subsets, and all the attacks were
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then sorted according to time. The first 90% of the attacks were reserved for training, and
the remaining 10% for testing. The byte and instruction histograms were used as features
to train and test the model; models constructed using a random forest classifier performed
the best, with an average accuracy of 0.37. Most of the misclassified samples tend to be
deceptive attacks and their replicates. When using machine learning approaches it is difficult
to map the reasons why a particular attacker was chosen, especially in cases of deception
where multiple attackers were associated with the same attack. Knowing the explanations
that supported a particular decision would greatly aid the analyst in making better decisions
dealing with uncertainty. To address this issue, in this chapter we described how we can
derive arguments based on the latent variables computed from the training data, given
an attack for attribution. This chapter proposes a framework, in which an argumentation
model is used to reason about deception and integrated with the machine learning model for
attacker prediction. This system achieved an accuracy of 62%, significantly improving the
performance for deceptive attacks.
In other literature, currently cyber-attribution is limited to identifying machines [14] as
opposed to the hacker or their affiliation to a group or a state. An example of such a technical
attribution approach is WOMBAT [34], where a clustering technique is used to group attacks
to common IP sources. A method that combines information from different sources was
proposed by Walls [132], who considered forensic information from diverse sources but did
not account for inconsistency or uncertainty due to deception. A less rigorous mathematical
approach, known as the Q model [102], was proposed recently; the model answers queries
from an analyst, and by combining these answers the analyst attributes an attack to a party.
Unfortunately, there are no experimental evaluations of its effectiveness. Similarly, other
work [126] combines cluster analysis with a component for multi-criteria decision analysis
and studied an implementation of this approach using honeypot data – again, this approach
lacks any ground truth of the actual hacker or hacking group.
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Argumentation has been used for cyber reasoning [7] by leveraging arguments to deal
with incomplete and contradictory data, allowing to derive big-picture conclusions to keep
systems secure and online in case of an attack. This is a different application than the
one we are addressing. Using argumentation to support human decisions was presented
in [117]. Here, the authors discuss how user trust in the evidence influences decision
making; demonstrating the hypotheses in a user-study [107]. Concurrently, a formal logical
framework for reasoning about cyber-attribution has been devised [56, 114]; it explores
multiple competing hypotheses based on the evidence for and against a particular attacker
to help analysts decide on an attribution, providing a map of the reasoning that led to the
decision. While that work inspired this chapter, it did not contain an empirical evaluation.
Adversarial machine learning is an emerging field of study. It uses effective machine
learning techniques to identify or defend against opponents. Understanding the limits of
adversaries’ knowledge and capabilities is crucial for coming up with countermeasures,
as discussed in [53]. Here the authors propose models to study these limitations to come
up with evasion techniques. On the contrary, Lowd and Meek [74] explore the problem
from an adversary’s point of view. They propose strategies that an adversary can use to
reverse engineer a classifier so that attacks are undetected by the classifier. They use a real
world application in spam filtering to demonstrate their method, which they call adversarial
classifier evasion. In a spam filtering setting, an example of such a technique is replacing
feature words that raise a red flag with their synonyms to evade detection. This feature cross
substitution technique is discussed in [69], where the authors offer a simple heuristic method
based on mixed-integer linear programming with constraint generation to make the classifier
robust to cross substitution techniques. There is also research that looks at modeling the
interaction between the learner (adversary) and the classifier in terms of a competition
using Stackelberg games [20, 19]. Most adversarial machine learning applications deal
with modeling classifiers to be robust against evasive techniques in real world applications
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like malware detection and spam filtering. On the contrary, our proposed system does not
model the adversary but instead analyzes the evidence to derive arguments for and against
a particular team being the attacker; so, in our system the adversary has no knowledge of
arguments as in the case of adversarial machine learning.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we demonstrated how leveraging Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP)
in an argumentation-based framework, can be leveraged to improve cyber-attribution de-
cisions. This is done by building DeLP programs based on real-world data; this approach
affords a reduction of the set of potential culprits and thus greater accuracy when using a clas-
sifier for cyber attribution. We thus proposed a hybrid system that integrates argumentation
with a learning model to make decisions.
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Chapter 4
DETERMINATION OF ADVERSARIAL INTENT
4.1 Introduction
Identifying the tasks 1 a given piece of malware was designed to perform (e.g. log-
ging keystrokes, recording video, establishing remote access, etc.) is a difficult and time
consuming task that is largely human-driven in practice [116]. The complexity of this task
increases substantially when you consider that malware is constantly evolving, and that how
each malware instance is classified may be different based on each cyber-security expert’s
own particular background. Automated solutions for this problem are highly attractive as
they can significantly reduce the time it takes to conduct remediation in the aftermath of a
cyber-attack.
Earlier work has sought to classify malware by similar “families”, something which has
been explored as a supervised classification problem [8, 60, 61]. However, differences over
determining “ground truth” for malware families (i.e. Symantec and McAfee cluster malware
into families differently) and the tendency for automated approaches to only succeed at “easy
to classify” samples [71, 98] are two primary drawbacks of malware family classification.
More recently, there has been work on directly inferring the tasks a malware was designed to
perform [54]. This approach leverages static malware analysis (i.e. analysis of the malware
sample conducted without execution, such as decompilation) and a comparison with a crowd-
source database of code snippets using a proprietary machine leaning approach. However,
a key shortcoming of the static method is that it is of limited value when the malware
authors encrypt part of their code – as we saw with the infamous Gauss malware [59]. This
1We use the term task and intent interchangeably throughout the work.
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work builds upon recent developments in the application of cognitive models to intelligence
analysis tasks [65] and our own preliminary studies on applying cognitive models to identify
the tasks a piece of malware was designed to perform [64, 125]. Specifically, in this chapter,
we report
• Experimental results illustrating consistent and significant performance improvements
(in terms of precision, recall, and F1) of the instance-based cognitive model approach
when compared with various standard machine learning approaches (including SVM,
logistic regression and random forests) for two different sandboxes and for three
different datasets.
• Experimental results showing a consistent and significant performance improvement
of the instance-based cognitive model and several other machine learning approaches
when compared to the current state-of-the-art commercial technology (based on static
analysis).
• Experiments where we study cases where the malware samples are mutated, encrypted,
and use different carriers - providing key insights into how our approach will cope
with operational difficulties.
• Experimental results illustrating that a cognitively-inspired intermediate step of infer-
ring probability distribution over malware families provides improved performance
over the machine learning and rule-based cognitive model (though no significant
change to the instance-based cognitive model).
• We also provide run-time comparisons of the experiments and discussing the cognitive
models in terms of parameter selection and time complexity analyses. We also explore
the concept of predicting hacker intentions on a host machine in real time.
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4.2 Technical Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter, we shall assume that we have a set of malware samples that
comprise a historical corpus (which we shall denote M) and each sample i ∈ M is
associated with a set of tasks (denoted tasks(i)) and a set of attributes (denoted attribs(i)).
Attributes are essentially binary features associated with a piece of malware that we can
observe using dynamic and/or static analysis while the tasks - which tell us the higher-level
purpose of the malware - must be determined by a human reviewing the results of such
analysis. AsM comprises our historical knowledge, we assume that for each i ∈M both
tasks(i) and attribs(i) are known. For a new piece of malware, we assume that we only
know the attributes. We also note that throughout the chapter, we will use the notation | · |
to denote the size of a given set. In Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide examples of the attributes
and tasks based on the malware samples from the Mandiant APT1 dataset (created from
samples available at [78], see also [77]). For instance hasDynAttrib looks at the behavior
section of the analysis report and extracts all the activity of the malware on the host machine.
The attribute usesDll enumerates all the libraries that were used by the malware on the host
machine. The file activity and the registry activity is captured by fileAct and regAct. Finally
all the processes initiated and terminated by the malware are captured by proAct. There is
not a fixed number of any of these attributes for a given malware. The number of attributes
depends on the analysis report generated from the sandbox. A full description of this dataset
is presented in Section 4.5.
Throughout the chapter, we will also often consider malware families, using the symbol
F to denote the set of all families. Each malware sample will belong to exactly one malware
family, and all malware samples belonging to a given family will have the same set of tasks.
Hence, we shall also treat each element of F as a subset ofM.
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Table 4.1: Attributes extracted through automated malware analysis
Attribute Intuition
usesDll(X) Malware uses a library X
regAct(K) Malware conducts an activity in the registry, modifying key K.
fileAct(X) Malware conducts an activity on certain file X
proAct Malware initiates or terminates a process
Table 4.2: Sample of malware tasks
Task Intuition
beacon Beacons back to the adversary’s system
enumFiles Designed to enumerate files on the target
serviceManip Manipulates services running on the target
takeScreenShots Takes screen shots
upload Designed to upload files from the target
4.3 Cognitively-Inspired Inference
While human inference has memory and attentional limitations, their cognitive processes
are powerful, where adaptive heuristic strategies are adopted to accomplish the tasks under
strong time constraints using limited means. An advantage of using a cognitive model
to describe inferential processes is that the underling architecture provides the benefits
of human-inspired inference while allowing for more flexibility over constraints such as
human working memory. We believe that there is a valid use of cognitive architectures for
artificial intelligence that makes use of basic cognitive mechanisms while not necessarily
making use of all constraints of the architecture. Reitter & Lebiere (2010) introduced a
modeling methodology called accountable modeling that recognizes that not every aspect of
a cognitive model is reflected in measurable performance. In that case, it is arguably better
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to specifically state which aspects of the model are not constrained by data, and rather than
mock up those aspects in plausible but impossible to validate manner, simply treat them as
unmodeled processes. This approach results in simpler models with a clear link between
mechanisms used and results accounted for, rather than being obscured by complex but
irrelevant machinery. For instance, while the models described in this chapter use activation
dynamics well-justified against human behavioral and neural data to account for features
such as temporal discounting, we do not directly model working memory constraints to
allow for more features of malware and more instances to be present in memory.
4.3.1 ACT-R Based Approaches
We propose two models built using the mechanisms of the ACT-R (Adaptive Control of
Thought-Rational) cognitive architecture [5]. These models leverage the work on applying
this architecture to intelligence analysis problems [65]. In particular, we look to leverage our
recently-introduced instance-based (ACTR-IB) and rule-based (ACTR-R) models [64, 125].
Previous research has argued that the ability of instance-based learning in complex dynamic
situations making it appropriate for sensemaking [45]. On the other hand the rule-based
learning is a more compact representation of associating samples in memory with their
respective families. In this section, we review some of the major concepts of the ACT-R
framework that are relevant to these models and provide a description of both approaches.
We leveraged features of the declarative memory and production system of the ACT-R
architecture to complete malware task identification. In ACT-R, recall from declarative
memory (c.f., identification, for our purposes) depends on three main components: activation
strengthening (i.e., the base-level activation of an element), associative (i.e., spreading)
activation, and inter-element similarity (i.e., partial matching). These three values are
summed together to represent an items total activation. When a recall is requested from
memory, the item with the highest total activation is retrieved.
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Declarative Knowledge. Declarative knowledge is represented formally in terms of chunks.
Chunks have an explicit type, and consist of an ordered list of slot-value pairs of information.
Chunks are retrieved from declarative memory by an activation process, and chunks are
each associated with an activation strength which in turn is used to compute a retrieval
probability. In this chapter, chunks will typically correspond to a malware family. In the
version of ACTR-IB where we do not represent families explicitly, the chunks correspond
with samples in the training data.
For a given chunk i, the activation strength Ai is computed as,
Ai = Bi + Si + Pi (4.1)
where, Bi is the base-level activation, Si is the spreading activation, and Pi is the partial
matching score. We describe each of these in more detail as follows.
Base-Level Activation (Bi): Technically, base-level for chunk i reflects both the frequency
and recency of samples in memory, even though we are not using recency here but it could
easily be applicable to weigh samples toward the more recent ones. More important, base-
level is set to the log of the prior probability (i.e., the fraction of samples associated with the
chunk) in ACTR-R; for instance-based (ACTR-IB), we set it to a base level constant βi.
Spreading Activation (Si): Spreading activation is a measure of the uniqueness of the
attributes between a test sample i and a sample j in memory. The spread of activation to
sample i is computed by the summing the strengths of association between sample j and
the attributes of the current sample i being considered. To compute the spreading activation
we compute the fan of attribute a (i.e., the number of samples in memory with attribute a)
for each attribute. The strength of association is computed differently in both approaches
and, in some cognitive model implementations, is weighted (as is done in ACTR-R of this
chapter).
Partial Matching (Pi): A partial matching mechanism computes the similarity between two
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samples. In this work, it is only relevant to the instance-based approach. Given a test sample
j, its similarity with a sample i in memory is computed as a product of the mismatch penalty
(mp, a parameter of the system) and the degree of mismatch Mji. We define the value of
Mji to be between 0 and −1; 0 indicates complete match while −1 complete mismatch.
As common with models based on the ACT-R framework, we shall discard chunks
whose activation strength is below a certain threshold (denoted τ ). Once the activation
strength, Ai, is computed for a given chunk, we can then calculate the activation probability,
Pr i. This is the probability that the cognitive model will recall that chunk and is computed
using the Boltzmann(softmax) equation [121], which we provide below.
Pri =
(e
Ai
s )∑
j(e
Aj
s )
(4.2)
Here, e is the base of the natural logarithm and s is momentary noise inducing stochasticity
by simulating background neural activation (this is also a parameter of the system).
4.3.2 ACT-R Instance-Based Model
The instance based model is an iterative learning method that reflects the cognitive pro-
cess of accumulating experiences (in this case the knowledge base of training samples) and
using them to predict the tasks for unseen test samples. Each malware instance associates a
set of attributes of that malware with its family. When a new malware sample is encountered,
the activation strength of that sample with each sample in memory is computed using Equa-
tion 4.1. The spreading activation is a measure of the uniqueness of the attributes between a
test sample i and a sample j in memory. To compute the spreading activation we compute
the fan for each attribute a (fan(a) finds all instances in memory with the attribute a) of the
test sample i. The Partial matching is computed as explained above. The degree of mismatch
is computed as the intersection between the attribute vector of the given malware and each
sample in memory normalized using the Euclidean distance between the two vectors. The
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retrieval probability of each sample j in memory with respect to the test sample i is then
computed using Equation 4.2. This generates a probability distribution over families. The
tasks are then determined by summing up the probability of the families associated with that
task with an appropriately set threshold (we set that threshold at 0.5(indicates that the model
should be more than 50% confident before a task is predicted for a test malware sample)).
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for the instance-based model.
ALGORITHM 1: ACT-R Instance-based Learning
INPUT: New malware sample i, historical malware corpusM.
OUTPUT: Set of tasks associated with sample i.
for query malware sample i do
for all j inM do
Bj = βj
Pj = mp× |attribs(i)∩attribs(j)|√|attribs(i)|×|attribs(j)|
for a ∈ attribs(i) do
if a ∈ attribs(j) then
sij += log(
|M|
|fan(a) |)
else
sij += log( 1|M|)
end if
end for
Sj =
∑
j
sij
|attribs(i)|
Calculate Aj as per Equation 4.1
end for
Calculate Pr j as per Equation 4.2
pf =
∑
j∈f s.t. Aj≥τ Pr j
tp = {t ∈ T |pf ≥ 0.5}
end for
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Time Complexity of Instance-based Model: The Instance based model has no explicit
training phase, so there are no training costs associated with it. For a given test sample the
model computes the activation function for each sample in the knowledge base. Hence the
time complexity increases linearly with the knowledge base. Let n be the number of the
samples in the knowledge base and m is the number of attributes associated with the test
sample, then the time complexity can be given as O(nm) for each test sample, as we expect
m to be relative small (n >> m), the relationship is linear in n.
4.3.3 ACT-R Rule-Based Model
In this version of ACT-R model we classify the samples based on simple rules computed
during the training phase. Given a malware training sample with its set of attributes a,
along with the ground truth family value, we compute a pair of conditional probabilities
p(a|f) and p(a|¬f) for an attribute in a piece of malware belonging (or not belonging) to
family f . These probabilistic rules (conditional probabilities) are used to set the strength of
association of the attribute with a family (sa,f ). The strength of association is weighted by
the source activation w to avoid retrieval failures for rule-based models. We use empirically
determined Bayesian priors p(f) to set the base-level of each family as opposed to using a
constant base-level for instance based. Only two components of the activation Equation 1
are used, namely the base-level and the spreading activation. Given the attributes for current
malware , we calculate the probability of the sample belonging to each family according to
Equation 2, generating a probability distribution over families.The task are then determined
in a similar way to that of instance-based model. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo code for the
rule-based model.
Time Complexity of Rule-based Model: For Rule-based model computing the rules for
each attribute in the knowledge base significantly adds to the computation time. Let n be
the number of samples in the training set, m be the number of attributes in the new piece
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ALGORITHM 2: ACT-R Rule-based Learning
INPUT: New malware sample i, historical malware corpusM.
OUTPUT: Set of tasks associated with new sample i.
TRAINING:
Let X =
⋃
j∈M attrib(j)
for all a in X do
Compute the set of rules p(a|f) and p(a|¬f)
(where p(a|f) = |{i∈M∩f |a∈attrib(i)}||f |
and p(a|¬f) = |{i∈M−f |a∈attrib(i)}||M|−|f | )
end for
TESTING:
for all f ∈ F do
Bf = log(p(f)) (where p(f) =
|f |
|M| )
for all a ∈ attrib(i) do
sa,f = log(
p(a|f)
p(a|¬f)); Sf =+
w×sa,f
|attribs(i)|
end for
Af = Bf + Sf
end for
Calculate pf as per Equation 4.2
tp = {t ∈ T |pf ≥ 0.5}
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of malware, and m∗ be the cardinality of
⋃
j∈M attrib(j). The resulting time complexity
for training is then O(m∗n) for training, which is significant as we observed m∗ >> m in
our study. While this is expensive, we note that for testing an individual malware sample,
the time complexity is less than the testing phase for the instance based O(|F|m) - though
the instance based model requires no explicit training phase (which dominates the time
complexity of the training phase for the rule-based approach).
4.3.4 Model Parameter Settings
The two proposed models leverage separate components of the activation function.
Table 4.3 provides a list of parameters used for both the ACT-R models - we use standard
ACT-R parameters that have been estimated from a wide range of previous ACT-R modeling
studies from other domains [137] and which are also suggested in the ACT-R reference
manual [15].
The intuition behind these parameters is as follows. The parameter s injects stochastic
noise in the model. It is used to compute the variance of the noise distribution and to compute
the retrieval probability of each sample in memory. The mismatch penalty parameter mp is
an architectural parameter that is constant across samples, but it multiplies the similarity
between the test sample and the samples in knowledge base. Thus, with a large value it
penalizes the mismatch samples more. It typically trades off against the value of the noise
s in a signal-to-noise ratio manner: larger values of mp lead to more consistent retrieval
of the closest matching sample whereas larger values of s leads to more common retrieval
of poorer matching samples.The activation threshold τ determines which samples will be
retrieved from memory to make task prediction decisions. The base level constant β is
used to avoid retrieval failures which might be caused due to high activation threshold. The
source activation w is assigned to each retrieval to avoid retrieval failures for rule-based
models.
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Table 4.3: Parameters for the Cognitive models
Model Parameters
Instance Based Learning β = 20 (base-level constant)
s = 0.1 (stochastic noise parameter)
τ = -10 (activation threshold)
mp = 20 (mismatch penalty)
Rule Based learning s = 0.1 (stochastic noise parameter)
w = 16 (source activation)
4.4 Experimental Setup
4.4.1 Baseline Approaches
We compare the proposed cognitive models against a variety of baseline approaches - one
commercial package and five standard machine learning techniques discussed in Section 2.3.
For the machine learning techniques, we generate a probability distribution over families and
return the set of tasks associated with a probability of 0.5 or greater while the commercial
software was used as intended by the manufacturer. Parameters for all baseline approaches
were set in a manner to provide the best performance.
Commercial Offering: Invencia Cynomix. Cynomix is a malware analysis tool made
available to researchers by Invencia industries [54] originally developed under DARPA’s
Cyber Genome project. It represents the current state-of-the-art in the field of malware
capability detection. Cynomix conducts static analysis of the malware sample and uses a
proprietary algorithm to compare it to crowd-sourced identified malware components where
the functionality is known.
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4.4.2 Dynamic Malware Analysis
Dynamic analysis studies a malicious program as it executes on the host machine. It uses
tools like debuggers, function call tracers, machine emulators, logic analyzers, and network
sniffers to capture the behavior of the program. We use two publicly available malware
analysis tools to generate attributes for each malware sample. These tools make use of a
sandbox, which is a controlled environment to run malicious software.
Anubis Sandbox. Anubis [55] is an online sandbox which generates an XML formated
report for a malware execution in a remote environment. It generates detailed static analysis
of the malware but provides less details regarding the behavior of the malware on the host
machine. Since it is hosted remotely we cannot modify its settings.
Cuckoo Sandbox. Cuckoo [29] is a standalone sandbox implemented using a dedicated
virtual machine and more importantly can be customized to suit our needs. It generates
detailed reports for both static as well as behavior analyses by watching and logging the
malware while its running on the virtual machine. These behavior analyses prove to be
unique indicators (behavior patterns common to a single family) for a given malware for the
experiments.
4.4.3 Performance Evaluation
In our tests, we evaluate performance based primarily on four metrics: precision, recall,
unbiased F1, and family prediction accuracy. For a given malware sample being tested,
precision is the fraction of tasks the algorithm associated with the malware that were actual
tasks in the ground truth. Recall, for a piece of malware, is the fraction of ground truth tasks
identified by the algorithm. The unbiased F1 is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
In our results, we report the averages for precision, recall, and unbiased F1 for the number
of trials performed. Our measure of family accuracy - the fraction of trials where the most
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probable family was the ground truth family of the malware in question - is meant to give
some insight into how the algorithm performs in the intermediate steps.
4.5 Results
All experiments were run on Intel core-i7 operating at 3.2 GHz with 16 GB RAM. Only one
core was used for experiments. Except where explicitly noted, the ACT-R parameters were
fixed as per Table 4.3 for all experiments (across all datasets and sandboxes).
4.5.1 Mandiant Dataset
Our first set of experiments uses a dataset based on the T1 cyber espionage group as
identified in the popular report by Mandiant Inc [77]. This dataset consisted of 132 real
malware samples associated with the Mandiant report that were obtained from the Contagio
security professional website [78]. Each malware sample belonged to one of 15 families
including BISCUIT, NEWSREELS, GREENCAT and COOKIEBAG. Based on the malware
family description [77], we associated a set of tasks with each malware family (that each
malware in that family was designed to perform). In total, 30 malware tasks were identified
for the given malware samples (see Table 4.2). On average, each family performed 9 tasks.
We compared the four machine learning approaches with the rule-based and instance-
based ACT-R models (ACTR-R and ACTR-IB respectively). We also submitted the samples
to the Cynomix tool for automatic detection of capabilities. These detected capabilities
were then manually mapped to the tasks from the Mandiant report. Precision and recall
values were computed for the inferred adversarial tasks. On average the machine learning
approaches predicted 9 tasks per sample, ACTR-R predicted 9 tasks per sample and ACTR-
IB predicted 10 tasks. On the other hand Cynomix was able to detect on average only 4
tasks.
Leave one out Cross-Validation (LOOCV).
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In leave one out cross validation, for n malware samples, train on n− 1 samples and test
on the remaining one. This procedure was repeated for all samples and the results were
averaged. We performed this experiment using both sandboxes and compared the results
(see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Performance comparison of Anubis and Cuckoo Sandbox
Method Anubis
(F1)
Cuckoo
(F1)
DT 0.80 0.80
NB 0.71 0.74
LOG-REG 0.82 0.85
SVM 0.86 0.90
RF 0.89 0.89
ACTR-R 0.85 0.88
ACTR-IB 0.93 0.96
Method Anubis
(Family)
Cuckoo
(Family)
DT 0.59 0.63
NB 0.30 0.40
LOG-REG 0.65 0.84
SVM 0.85 0.86
RF 0.82 0.86
ACTR-R 0.73 0.89
ACTR-IB 0.81 0.93
The average F1 increases by 0.03 when we use the attributes generated by the Cuckoo
sandbox instead of Anubis. The statistical significance results are as follows: for ACTR-IB
(t (132) = 1.94, p = 0.05), ACTR-R (t (132) = 1.39, p = 0.16), RF (t (132) = 0.56, p = 0.57),
SVM (t (132) = 1.95, p = 0.05), LOG-REG (t (132) = 1.82, p = 0.07), NB (t (132) = 1.79, p
= 0.08) and DT (t (132) = 0.83, p = 0.4). But the significant improvement was in the family
prediction values with ACTR-IB improving by 0.12 from 0.81 to 0.93 (t (132) = 3.86, p <
.001) and ACTR-R by 0.15 from 0.72 to 0.87 (t (132) = 3.78, p < .001) outperforming all
other methods. Since having behavior analysis helps in better task prediction as seen from
the comparison experiment, we use cuckoo sandbox for rest of our experiments.
Fig. 4.1 compares the performance of the five best performing methods from Table 1
and compares it with the Cynomix tool of Invincea industries. ACTR-IB outperformed
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Fig. 4.1: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons using cuckoo
sandbox for LOG-REG, RF, SVM, ACTR-R, ACTR-IB and INVINCEA.
LOG-REG, SVM, RF and ACTR-R; average F1 = 0.97 vs 0.85 (t (132) = 7.85, p < .001),
0.9 (t (132) = 4.7, p < .001), 0.89 (t (132) = 5.45, p < .001) and 0.88 (t (132) = 5.2, p <
.001) respectively. Both the proposed cognitive models and machine learning techniques
significantly outperformed the Cynomix tool in detecting the capabilities (tasks).
These three approaches (LOG-REG, SVM, RF) were also evaluated with respect to
predicting the correct family (before the tasks were determined). ACTR-IB outperformed
LOG-REG, SVM, RF and ACTR-R; average family prediction = 0.93 vs 0.84 (t (132) =
3.22, p < .001), 0.86 (t (132) = 3.13, p < .001), 0.86 (t (132) = 3.13, p < .001) and 0.89 (t
(132) = 2.13, p = .03) respectively.
Task Prediction without inferring families:
In the proposed models we infer the malware family first and then predict the tasks associated
with that family. However, differences over “ground truth” for malware families in the
cyber-security community calls for a direct inference of tasks without dependence on family
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prediction. In this section we adapt the models to predict tasks directly without inferring the
family.
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Fig. 4.2: Average Precision, Recall, and F1 comparisons for LOG-REG, RF, SVM, ACTR-R
and ACTR-IB for Mandiant without inferring families.
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Fig. 4.3: Training time for LOG-REG, SVM, RF and ACTR-R with(left) / without(right)
inferring families.
Fig. 4.2 shows the performance of the cognitive and machine learning models without
inferring the families.There is no difference in the performance of ACTR-IB and ACTR-R
approaches as compared to Fig.2 where we use families. On the other hand direct task
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prediction reduces the F1 measure of machine learning techniques on average by almost 0.1.
This is due to the fact that, now instead of having a single classifier for each family we have
multiple classifiers for each task that a malware sample is designed to perform. This not only
degrades the performance but also adds to the training time for these methods (including
the ACT-R rule-based approach). We compare the training time with increase in training
data for task prediction with/without inferring families. Inferring families first reduces the
training time (see Fig. 4.3 (a)). On the other hand predicting tasks directly significantly in-
creases the training time for the machine learning methods along with the rule-based ACT-R
approach (Fig. 4.3 (b)). Due to the issues with respect to performance and training time, we
consider inferring families first for the rest of the experiments. An important point to note
is this has no effect on the Instance-based model for both performance and computation time.
Parameter Exploration:
We now discuss two system parameters that control the performance of the ACT-R instance
based model namely the stochastic noise parameter (s) and the activation threshold (τ ). We
use the Mandiant dataset to perform this evaluation. The parameter s takes values between
0.1 and 1 (typical values range from 0.1 to 0.3). The value of the activation threshold depends
on the application. Fig. 4.4 shows the variation of family prediction accuracy and F1 score
with respect to different noise parameter values and for different activation thresholds. The
parameter s is used to compute the variance of the noise distribution and retrieval probability
of sample in memory. Larger value of s triggers the retrieval of poor matching samples,
which leads to lower family prediction and F1 scores. As seen in the Fig. 4.4, as the value of
s increases the performance decreases. On the other hand, the activation threshold dictates
how many closely matched samples will be retrieved from memory. For high values of τ the
performance decreases as many fewer samples are retrieved. For lower values of τ we end
up retrieving almost all the samples in the training data, hence the performance does not
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Fig. 4.4: Family prediction and F1 value for different threshold and noise parameters values.
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decrease as τ decreases, but it adds to the computational cost of retrieving high number of
samples which is not desirable. We get the best performance for τ = -10 and s = 0.1. Even s
= 0.2 is almost as good as 0.1 providing some advantages in terms of stochasticity ensuring
robustness
We keep the base-level constant (β) and mismatch penalty (mp) values constant. As
explained earlier the base-level constant trades off directly against the retrieval threshold,
and the mismatch penalty against the activation noise, respectively, so it makes sense to vary
only one of the pair.
4.5.2 GVDG Dataset
GVDG is a malware generation tool designed for the study of computer threats [47]. It
is capable of generating the following malware threats:
• File-virus
• Key-Logger
• Trojan-Extortionist
• USB-Worm
• Web Money-Trojan
Fig. 4.5 shows the GVDG user interface used for the generation of malware samples.
We can select the carrier type and the tasks that we want the malware sample to perform
on the host machine. The tasks are represented as payloads, while carrier is a functional
template which can be modified to execute the tasks desired by the user on the host system.
In generating datasets with GVDG, we specify families based on sets of malware with the
same tasks. Whether or not a family consists of malware with the same carrier depends
on the experiment. Further, GVDG also has an option to increase “mutation” or variance
among the samples. We perform experiments analyzing the performance of the proposed
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Fig. 4.5: GVDG User Interface
methods when the generated samples belong to different carrier and same carrier types, as
well as when the samples are encrypted and mutated making task prediction difficult. In all
the experiments we consider 60% of the data for training and 40% for testing. The results
are averaged across 10 trials. The Cynomix tool from Invencia was unable to detect any
tasks for the GVDG dataset, primarily due to its inability to find public source documents
referencing GVDG samples and also unable to generalize from similar samples.
Different Carriers:
In this experiment, we generated 1000 samples for each carrier type with low mutation.
On average each carrier type performs 7 tasks(payloads). Hence each carrier represents one
family for this experiment. Both random forest and ACTR-IB model were able to predict
the tasks and family with F1 measure of 1.0 outperforming LOG-REG 1 vs 0.91 , SVM 1 vs
0.95 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.95. All results are statistical significant with (t (1998) ≥ 8.93, p <
.001)(Fig. 4.6). Also for family prediction ACTR-IB and RF outperformed LOG-REG 1 vs
0.92, SVM 1 vs 0.92 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.95 (t (1998) ≥ 8.93, < .001).
These results are not surprising given that different carrier(family) types have high
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Fig. 4.6: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for different carrier samples.
Fig. 4.7: Similarity matrix for 5 different carriers .
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dissimilarity between them. Also, samples belonging to the same carrier have on average
60% of similar attributes. Fig. 4.7 shows the similarity between the carrier types. The
similarity between families is calculated in the same way as ACTR-IB partial matching with
0 indicating complete match while −1 complete mismatch.
Different Carriers-Mutation:
For this case, we generate the same samples as in the previous experiment but with maximum
mutation between samples belonging to the same carrier. We generated 1000 samples for
each carrier with maximum mutation. In this case ACTR-IB had an average F1 of 1
outperforming LOG-REG 1 vs 0.83, SVM 1 vs 0.88 , RF 1 vs 0.96 and ACTR-R 1 vs
0.92 (t (1998) ≥ 7, p < .001)(Fig. 4.8). Also for family prediction ACTR-IB outperformed
LOG-REG 1 vs 0.85, SVM 1 vs 0.88 , RF 1 vs 0.95 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.92 (t (1998) ≥ 7, p
< .001).
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Fig. 4.8: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for different carrier mutated samples.
High mutation induces high variance between samples associated with the same carrier
making the classification task difficult. High mutation samples belonging to same carrier
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have only 20% of common attributes as compared to 60% for low mutation.
Less Training data:
In order to see how the cognitive models perform with less training data, we repeated the
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Fig. 4.9: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for less training data.
different-carrier mutation experiment with 10% of the training data selected uniformly at
random (300 samples). Even with less training data ACTR-IB had an average F1 of 0.93
outperforming LOG-REG 0.93 vs 0.71, SVM 0.93 vs 0.6, RF 0.93 vs 0.83 and ACTR-R
0.93 vs 0.88 (t (1998) ≥ 2.89, p ≤ .001), see Fig. 4.9. Also for family prediction ACTR-IB
outperformed LOG-REG 0.91 vs 0.73 (t (1998) = 19.3, p < .001), SVM 0.91 vs 0.58, RF
0.91 vs 0.79 and ACTR-R 0.91 vs 0.88 (t (1998) ≥ 2.05, p ≤ 0.04).
Different Carriers: Low-High Mutation:
For this case, we consider the low mutation samples as training data and the high mutation
samples as testing. Fig. 4.10 shows the comparison results. ACTR-IB had an average F1
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of 0.96 outperforming LOG-REG 0.96 vs 0.83, SVM 0.96 vs 0.92, RF 0.96 vs 0.93 and
ACTR-R 0.96 vs 0.88 (t (2498) ≥ 15.7, p < .001), see Fig. 4.10. Also for family prediction
ACTR-IB outperformed LOG-REG 0.96 vs 0.81, SVM 0.96 vs 0.92, RF 0.96 vs 0.94 and
ACTR-R 0.96 vs 0.88 (t (2498) ≥ 7, p < .001).
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Fig. 4.10: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for low-high mutated samples.
Leave one carrier out cross-validation:
To see how the models generalize to unseen malware family(carrier), we performed a
leave-one-carrier-out comparison, where we test the models against one previously unseen
malware carrier. ACTR-IB performs better or on par with all other baseline approaches for
all the carriers. It clearly outperforms all the approaches in recalling most of the actual tasks
(40%) (see Fig. 4.11). ACTR-IB has shown to generalize for unseen malware families [64].
This case is difficult given the fact that the test family is not represented during training,
hence task prediction depends on associating the test family with the training families that
perform similar tasks.
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Fig. 4.11: Average F1 values for 5 malware carriers (above) and the average precision, recall
and F1 across all carriers (below) for LOG-REG, SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for
Leave-one-carrier-out.
Same Carrier:
As seen in the previous experiments, different carrier types makes the task easier because of
less similarity between them. We now test the performance, on same carrier type performing
exactly one task. Since there are 17 tasks in the GVDG tool, we generate 100 samples for
each task for carrier type File-virus. In this experiment each task represents one family.
Thus in total we have 1700 samples. We do the 60-40 split experiment. From Fig. 4.12
ACTR-IB had an average F1 of 0.95 outperforming LOG-REG 0.95 vs 0.84, SVM 0.95 vs
0.87, RF 0.95 vs 0.90 and ACTR-R 0.95 vs 0.92 (t (678) ≥ 1.52 , p ≤ 0.13). Since each
family performs exactly one task the family prediction is similar to F1. Using the same
carrier for each payload makes the task difficult as can be seen from the similarity matrix
for the 17 payloads(Fig. 4.13).
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Fig. 4.12: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for unencrypted same carrier samples.
Fig. 4.13: Similarity matrix for 17 versions of the same carrier .
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Same Carrier-Encryption:
The GVDG tool provides the option for encrypting the malware samples for the File-virus
carrier type. We use this option to generate 100 encrypted malware samples for each
task(payload) and use them as test data with the unencrypted versions from the same carrier
experiment as training samples. From Fig. 4.14 ACTR-IB had an average F1 of 0.9 outper-
forming LOG-REG 0.9 vs 0.8, SVM 0.9 vs 0.8, RF 0.9 vs 0.74 and ACTR-R 0.9 vs 0.88 (t
(1698) ≥ 2.36 , p ≤ 0.02). Encrypting malware samples morphs the task during execution
making it difficult to detect during analysis. Hence the drop in performance as compared to
non-encrypted samples.We note that SVM performs better than RF likely because it looks
to maximize generalization.
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Fig. 4.14: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for encrypted same carrier samples.
Runtime analysis:
Table 4.5 shows the classifier run times for the experiments. Machine learning techniques
are faster but have large training times, which increase almost linearly with the size of the
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knowledge base. Hence updating the knowledge base is computationally expensive for these
methods, as it has to re-estimate the parameters every time. The same notion holds true
for ACTR-R, since computing the rules during training phase is expensive as can be seen
from the large training times. ACTR-IB on the other hand has no explicit training phase,
so the only time cost is during testing. In fact ACTR-IB is faster than SVM and RF for
same/encrypted carrier experiments.
Scaling of Instance-based model:
Finally to conclude the GVDG experiments, we run ACTR-IB on a combination of all
the above variations of dataset to highlight the space requirements for the learning model.
The dataset comprises of 5 different carriers with low/high mutation (10,000 samples) and
same carrier encrypted/non-encrypted (3400 samples). Based on the tasks they perform we
have in total 22 families represented by 13,400 samples. The analysis reports generated by
cuckoo take up 4 gigabytes of disk space for the samples. We significantly reduce the size
to 600 megabytes by parsing the analysis reports and extracting attributes. We set aside 10%
of the samples for testing (1340) and iteratively add 10% of the remaining data for training.
Table 4.6 gives a summary of the average F1 measure and testing time for ACTR-IB. The
results are averaged across 10 trials. There is a steady increase in performance till we reach
40% of the training data, after that the F1 measure remains almost constant. This experiment
clearly indicates the ability of the ACTR-IB to learn from small amount of representation
from each family, significantly reducing the size of the knowledge base required for training.
We are also looking into techniques to reduce the time requirements of instance-based
learning algorithm (e.g., Andrew Moore explored efficient tree-based storage). There are
also techniques for reducing space requirements, [110] merged training instances in the
ACT-R-Gammon model and obtained considerable space savings at little performance cost.
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Table 4.5: Classifier run times
Experiment Model Train(sec) Test(sec)
different carriers
LOG-REG 202 7
SVM 250 50
RF 280 30
ACTR-R 6443 143
ACTR-IB - 453
mutated carriers
LOG-REG 214 18
SVM 260 63
RF 303 85
ACTR-R 7223 185
ACTR-IB - 465
same carriers
LOG-REG 152 4.22
SVM 270 38
RF 290 55
ACTR-R 4339 120
ACTR-IB - 205
encrypted carriers
LOG-REG 180 15
SVM 300 80
RF 353 110
ACTR-R 6103 180
ACTR-IB - 365
4.5.3 MetaSploit
MetaSploit is a popular penetration testing tool used by security professionals to identify
flaws in the security systems by creating attack vectors to exploit those flaws [95]. Penetra-
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Table 4.6: Summary of ACTR-IB results
Fraction of training data F1 measure Test time(sec)
0.1 0.77 418
0.2 0.82 839
0.3 0.90 1252
0.4 0.97 1676
0.5 0.97 2100
0.6 0.97 2525
0.7 0.97 2956
0.8 0.98 3368
0.9 0.98 3787
1.0 0.98 4213
tion testing may also be defined as the methods an attacker would employ to gain access
to security systems. Hence identifying the tasks the exploit was designed to perform is
important to counter the exploit.
For this experiment we generate exploits that attacks windows operating systems. Each
exploit has a set of tasks associated with it. The tasks include setting up tcp & udp back-door
connections, adding unauthorized users to the system, modifying root privileges, download
executables and execute them on the local machine, prevent writing of data to disk, deleting
system folders, copying sensitive information etc. We generated 4 exploit families with
100 samples each performing on average 4 tasks. We induced mutation between samples
belonging to the same family making the classification task difficult. We perform a 60-40
split training-testing experiment and average the results across 10 trials. From Fig. 4.15
ACTR-IB had an average F1 of 0.86 outperforming LOG-REG 0.86 vs 0.62, SVM 0.86 vs
0.82, RF 0.86 vs 0.82, ACTR-R 0.86 vs 0.81 and Invencia 0.86 vs 0.8 (t (158) ≥ 1.94 , p ≤
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Fig. 4.15: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction comparisons for LOG-REG,
SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB for MetaSploit samples.
0.05). Also for family prediction ACTR-IB outperformed LOG-REG 0.8 vs 0.7, SVM 0.8
vs 0.72, RF 0.8 vs 0.72 and ACTR-R 0.8 vs 0.71 (t (158) ≥ 2.53 , p ≤ 0.01).
4.5.4 Task Prediction from Hacker activities
In all the experiments discussed so far, the tasks associated with a given piece of malware
are predefined and do not change with time. In this section , we try to map the tasks that a
hacker is trying to achieve from the activities it performs on a compromised system. For the
entire experiment only one malware is used whose sole purpose is to create a tcp backdoor
connection to let the hacker have access to the system. We evaluate the test samples only
using ACTR-IB and not other machine learning methods. The goal of this experiment is
to demonstrate how the system can deal with real time hacker activities on a compromised
system. It demonstrates the capability of the proposed system to capture hacker behavior.
The experimental setup is as follows. We keep the Cuckoo sandbox running on the
system by executing the malware. This will create a connection between the hacker and
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the system. Once the hacker gains control of the machine, he can perform operations in
order to achieve his objectives. We treat these objectives as the tasks that the hacker wants
to complete on the system. Once these tasks are completed, Cuckoo generates an analysis
report detailing the behavioral analysis of the hacker. However, these analytics are too
detailed for instance file and registry execution commands and do not provide a clear picture
of the main tasks of the hacker on the machine. Hence, traditionally, this will often require
an expert security analyst to go through large analysis results to determine the task which is
often time consuming. But instead we can feed the analysis report to the ACTR-IB model
to get a prediction of the hacker tasks. For this experiment we use the MetaSploit dataset
discussed in Section 4.5.3 as the knowledge base for the instance based approach. For the
test set we generate samples in real time with hackers trying to achieve their goals (tasks) on
the compromised system. Note, this test also illustrates how well our model generalizes,
as we are identifying hacker behavior using historical data that was not generated by the
hacker - or even a human in this case. We consider two hackers, who are given a list of the
payloads (tasks) to complete from the list mentioned in Section 4.5.3. They always perform
a fraction of the tasks assigned to them at a given time instance and then the model is tested
on predicting these tasks.
We generate 10 such attacks , 5 from each hacker. Each attack consists of achieving 5
tasks on average. We note that for each of the test sample the malware used is the same.
ACTR-IB results are presented in Table 4.7. The results are averaged for each hacker across
test samples. Table 4.7 shows the actual and predicted tasks for Hacker-1 for 5 different
attack instances. The results for Hacker-2 were analogous.
4.6 Related Work
Identification of malicious software. The identification of whether or not binary is ma-
licious [38, 123] is an important related, yet distinct problem from what we study in this
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Table 4.7: Summary of ACTR-IB results
Subject Average
Precision
Average
Recall
Average F1
Hacker-1 0.8 0.85 0.83
Hacker-2 0.85 0.85 0.85
chapter and can be regarded as a “first step” in the analysis of suspicious binaries in the
aftermath of a cyber-attack. However, we note that as many pieces of malware are designed
to perform multiple tasks, that successful identification of a binary as malicious does not
mean that the identification of its associated tasks will be a byproduct of the result - and
hence this is normally the case, which has led to some of the other related work described in
this section.
Malware family classification. There is a wealth of existing work on malware family
identification [8, 60, 61, 70, 97, 48, 109, 6, 28]. The intuition here is that by identifying
the family of a given piece of malware, an analyst can then more easily determine what it
was designed to do based on previously studied samples from the same family. However,
malware family classification has suffered from two primary drawbacks: (1) disagreement
about malware family ground truth as different analysts (e.g. Symantec and McAfee) cluster
malware into families differently; and (2) previous work has shown that some of these
approaches mainly succeed in “easy to classify” samples [71, 98], where “easy to classify”
is a family that is agreed upon by multiple malware firms. In this chapter, we infer the
specific tasks a piece of malware was designed to carry out. While we do assign malware
to a family as a component of our approach, to avoid the two aforementioned issues as
the family partition is done so probabilistically and the result ground truth is the focus of
our comparison (though we show family prediction results as a side-result). Further, we
also describe and evaluation a variant of our instance-based method that does not consider
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Table 4.8: Actual and predicted Hacker-1 attacks
Attack Instance Actual Tasks Predicted Tasks
1 setup backdoor connection
modify root privileges
uninstall program
copy files
setup backdoor connection
modify root privileges
uninstall program
delete system files
prevent access to drive
2 setup backdoor connection
modify root privileges
download executables
execute files
copy files
setup backdoor connection
modify root privileges
download executables
execute files
delete files
3 setup backdoor connection
modify root privileges
add unauthorized users
start keylogging
uninstall program
delete files
prevent access to drives
setup backdoor connection
modify root privileges
add unauthorized users
start keylogging
unistall program
delete files
4 setup backdoor connection
add unauthorized users
prevent writing data to disk
delete files
copy files
setup backdoor connection
add unauthorized users
prevent writing data to disk
delete files
modifying root privileges
prevent access to drives
5 setup backdoor connection
download executables
execute files
start keylogging
setup backdoor connection
download executables
execute files
start keylogging
families and yields a comparable performance to our instance-based method that does
consider families.
Malware task identification. With regard to direct inference of malware tasks, the major
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related work include the software created by the firm Invincea [54] for which we have
included a performance comparison. Additionally, some of the ideas in this chapter were
first introduced in [64, 125, 88]. However, that work primarily focused on describing the
intuitions behind the cognitive modeling techniques and only included experimental evalua-
tion on two datasets (the Mandiant APT1 and GVDG datasets). The experimental evaluation
in this chapter includes additional experiments for the GVDG dataset to consolidate the
previous experiments. Also algorithm analysis and parameter exploration is provided for
the cognitive models. In addition we introduce a popular penetration tool used by security
analyst MetaSploit and present new results on this tool. These experiments evaluate the
proposed model thoroughly to pave the way toward deployment for use by cyber-security
analysts.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced an automated method that combines dynamic malware
analysis with cognitive modeling to identify malware tasks. This method obtains excellent
precision and recall - often achieving an unbiased F1 score of over 0.9 - in a wide variety
of conditions over three different malware sample collections and two different sandbox
environments - outperforming a variety of baseline methods.
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Chapter 5
DARKWEB AND DEEPWEB MINING FOR CYBERSECURITY THREAT
INTELLIGENCE
5.1 Introduction
With the widespread use of technology, cyber-security has become an important issue of
concern for both commercial organizations and governments. With the recent incidents of
data breach at Home Depot, Target and Sony via malicious softwares, many organizations
are looking at proactive techniques to avoid being targeted or minimize the damage of such
attacks.
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Fig. 5.1: Weekly detection of cyber-
threats.
Fig. 5.2: Social network.
Pre-reconnaissance cyber threat intelligence refers to information gathered before a
malicious party interacts with the defended computer system. An example demonstrating
the importance of cyber threat intelligence is shown in Table 5.1. A Microsoft Windows
vulnerability was identified in Feb. 2015. The release of the vulnerability was essentially
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Table 5.1: Exploit example.
Timeline Event
February 2015 Microsoft identifies Windows vulnerability MS15-010/CVE 2015-
0057 for remote code execution. There was no publicly known
exploit at the time the vulnerability was released.
April 2015 An exploit for MS15-010/CVE 2015-0057 was found on a dark-
web market on sale for 48 BTC (around $10,000-15,000).
July 2015 FireEye identified that the Dyre Banking Trojan, designed to steal
credit card number, actually exploited this vulnerability 1 .
Microsoft warning its customers of a security flaw. Note that at this time, there was no
publicly known method to leverage this flaw in a cyber-attack (i.e. an available exploit).
However, about a month later an exploit was found to be on sale in darkweb market. It was
not until July when FireEye, a major cybersecurity firm, identified that the Dyre Banking
Trojan designed to steal credit cards exploited this vulnerability - the first time an exploit was
reported. This vignette demonstrates how threat warnings gathered from the darkweb can
provide valuable information for security professionals. The average global exposure of the
Dyre Banking Trojan was 57.3% along with another banking malware Dridex 2 . It means
that nearly 6 out of 10 organizations in the world were affected, and this is a significantly
high number on a global level.
In another instance, 17-year-old hacker Sergey Taraspov, from St. Petersburg. along
with a small team of hackers, allegedly wrote a piece of malware that targeted point-of-sale
(POS) software, and sold it for $2,000 on a Russian forum/marketplace. This malware was,
in turn, used by around forty individuals to steal over 110 million American credit card
2https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/evolution of dridex.html
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numbers in the ”Target“- data breach of 2013 3 .
In this chapter, we examine how such intelligence can be gathered and analyzed from
various social platforms on the Internet particularly sites on the darkweb and deepweb.
In doing so, we encounter several problems that we addressed with various data mining
techniques. At the time of development the system was actively collecting approximately
305 cyber threats each week. Fig. 5.2 shows a subset of a social network built using the
collected data. Since then we have transitioned the system to a commercial partner 4 . Fig. 5.1
shows the cumulative trend in threat detection for five weeks at the time of development.
Table 5.2 shows the database statistics before transition. It shows the total data collected and
the data related to malicious hacking. The vendor and user statistics cited only consider those
individuals associated in the discussion or sale of malicious hacking-related material, as
identified by the system. The data is collected from three sources on the darkweb/deepweb:
markets, forums, and subreddits.
We are providing information to cyber-security professionals to support their strategic
cyder-defense planning to address questions such as,
1. What vendors and users have a presence in multiple darkweb/deepweb markets/
forums?
2. What zero-day exploits are being developed by malicious hackers?
3. What vulnerabilities do the latest exploits target?
In this chapter we provide,
• Description of a system for cyber threat intelligence gathering from various social
platforms from the Internet such as deepweb and darkweb websites.
3https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/skilled-cheap-russian-hackers-power-
american-cybercrime-n22371
4Cyber Reconnaissance, Inc. (CRY3CON), https://www.cyr3con.com.
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Table 5.2: Current Database Status
Markets
Total Number 27
Total products 11991
Hacking related 1573
Vendors 434
Forums
Total Number 21
Topics/Posts 23780/162872
Hacking related 4423/31168
Users 5491
Subreddits
Total Number 33
Topics/Posts 3940/19601
Hacking related 1654/8270
• The implementation and evaluation of learning models to separate relevant information
from noise in the data collected from these online platforms.
• A machine learning approach to aid security experts in the discovery of new relevant
deepweb and darkweb websites of interest using topic modeling– this reduces the
time and cost associated with identifying new deepweb and darkweb sites.
• A series of case studies showcasing various findings relating to malicious hacker
behavior resulting from the data collected by our operational system..
5.2 Background
Many of the individuals behind cyber-operations – originating outside of government
run labs or military commands – rely on a significant community of hackers. They interact
through a variety of online forums (as means to both stay anonymous and to reach geograph-
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ically dispersed collaborators). For instance, the distribution of MegalodonHTTP Remote
Access Trojan (RAT) utilized the amateur black hat platform, HackForum. Five people
accused of the malware’s creation and/or distribution resided in three European countries,
requiring law enforcement to cooperate internationally in pursuit of the malicious hackers’
arrest [134]. The international nature of the cyber-domain - the organization of cooperating
malicious hackers as well as their international targets - transcends not only territorial
executive powers, but illustrates the importance of virtual communication platforms.
Darknet and Deepnet Sites. Widely used for underground communication, “The Onion
Router” (Tor) is free software dedicated to protect the privacy of its users by obscuring
traffic analysis as a form of network surveillance [36]. The network traffic in Tor is guided
through a number of volunteer-operated servers (also called “nodes”). Each node of the
network encrypts the information it blindly passes on neither registering where the traffic
came from nor where it is headed [36], disallowing any tracking. Effectively, this allows
not only for anonymized browsing (the IP-address revealed will only be that of the last
node), but also for circumvention of censorship 5 . Here we will use “darkweb” to denote
the anonymous communication provided by crypto-networks like “Tor”, which stands in
contrast to “deepweb” which commonly refers to websites hosted on the open portion of
the Internet (the “Clearnet”), but not indexed by search engines [62]. Corporate websites
supporting employees and library catalogs are good examples of deepweb presences.
Malicious Hacking. Hacking as a subculture has been the subject of many publications,
amongst them Steven Levy’s seminal “hackers” [68], which outlines ideological premises
which many early computer geeks and programmers shared. The machines comprising the
early computers were extensions of the self [130], which might compliment the creative
ownership and the demand for free software that permeated Levy’s account [68]. The term
“hacker” in recent use (and especially in popular media) has become restricted to individuals
5See the Tor Project’s official website (https://www.torproject.org/)
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who seek unauthorized access to computers and computer networks not their own with the
purpose to manipulate, steal, log or alter data or structures [49, 118].
Markets. Users advertise and sell their wares on marketplaces. Darknet marketplaces pro-
vides a new avenue to gather information about the cyber threat landscape. The marketplaces
sell goods and services relating to malicious hacking, drugs, pornography, weapons and
software services. Only a small fraction of products (13% in our collected data to date) are
related to malicious hacking. Vendors often advertise their products on forums to attract
attention towards their goods and services. Marketplaces have wallets to deposit digital
currency into, but sometimes forum administrators serve as an escrow service. Products are
most often verified before any funds are released to the seller. If a seller is misleading or
fails to deliver the appropriate item, they are banned from the site. Similarly, buyers can be
banned for not complying with the transaction rules.
Forums. Forums are user-oriented platforms that have the sole purpose of enabling com-
munication. It provides the opportunity for the emergence of a community of like-minded
individuals - regardless of their geophysical location. Administrators set up Darkweb forums
with communication safety for their members in mind. During registration (though not
necessarily with every login) every prospective member has to complete CAPTCHAS (Com-
pletely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), answer simple
questions, solve puzzles or complete simple arithmetic operation, presumably to prevent
automated access. Discussion forums on the Darkweb consist of boards and sub-boards
(also called “child-boards”) filled with threads concerned with different topics. While
structure and organization of Darkweb-hosted forums might be very similar to more familiar
web-forums, the topics and concerns of the users vary distinctly. In the English clandestine
Darkweb, people interested in cats, steampunk, and the latest conspiracy theories convene,
but an abundance of arenas dedicated to child pornography (CP), drugs, and weapons can
also be found. Other forums appear to be venues for sharing erotic images – whether
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Fig. 5.3: System overview
involving real persons or cartoon characters. Lengthy threads seek information on the
reliability of individual vendors and marketplaces in general. Links to other Darkwebsites
and information on potentially fraudulent websites are especially useful in the absence of
pervasive search engines and can be found on many forums. Forums addressing malicious
hackers feature discussions on programming, hacking, and cyber-security. Threads are
dedicated to security concerns like privacy and online-safety - topics which plug back into
and determine the structures and usage of the platforms.
Subreddits. Subreddits can be considered as a subset of forums. Important information
regarding the marketplace environment including reviews of marketplaces, products, and
vendors are often discussed on subreddits. These links and sentiments about markets provide
insight. For instance, we might learn to predict when popular opinion shifts with respect
to a certain market. Subreddits also provide information concerning marketplaces and
forums that are newly introduced or old ones that are shutting down. Hence crawling these
subreddits could provide good insight into the marketplace and forum environment.
5.3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Fig. 5.3 gives the overview of the system. Through search engines and spider services
on the Tor network, human analysts were able to find forums and marketplaces populated
by malicious hackers. Other platforms were discovered through links posted on forums
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either on the Tor-network or on the Clearnet. The system consists of three main modules
built independently before integration. The system is currently fully integrated and actively
collecting cyber threat intelligence.
Crawler: The crawler is a program designed to traverse the website and retrieve HTML
documents. Topic based crawlers have been used for focused crawling where only webpages
of interest are retrieved [83, 24]. More recently, focused crawling was employed to collect
forum discussions from darkweb [41]. We have designed separate crawlers for different
platforms (markets/forums) identified by experts due to the structural difference and access
control measures for each platform. In our crawler we address design challenges like
accessibility, unresponsive server, repeating links creating a loop etc. to gather information
regarding products from markets and discussions on forums.
Parser: We designed a parser to extract specific information from marketplaces (regarding
sale of malware/exploits) and hacker forums (discussion regarding services and threats). This
well-structured information is stored in a relational database. We maintain two databases,
one for marketplaces and the other for forums. Like the crawler, each platform has its own
parser. The parser also communicates with the crawler from time to time for collection of
temporal data. The parser communicates a list of relevant webpages to the crawler, which are
re-crawled to get time-varying data. For markets we collect the following important products
fields: {item title, item description, vendor name, shipping details, item reviews, items sold,
CVE, items left, transaction details, ratings}. For forums and subreddits we collect the
following fields: {topic content, post content, topic author, post author, author status,
reputation, topic interest}.
Classifier: Automating the process of classifying a web page as being relevant to the topic
of interest greatly expedites data collection. As the crawler traverses darkweb links faster
than any human could possibly classify the sites, it is important that the classification portion
of the pipeline is able to keep up. By requiring humans to classify each site as relevant or
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irrelevant, there is a bottleneck in the classification stage and the throughput of the data
gathering pipeline is greatly diminished. We address unique classification challenges. First,
to discover new relevant websites using a topic-modeling technique. Second, we employ
a machine learning technique using an expert-labeled dataset to detect relevant products
and topics from marketplaces and forums respectively. These classifiers are integrated into
the parser to filter out products and threads relating to drugs, weapons, etc. not relevant to
malicious hacking.
5.4 Evaluation
We address distinct classification problems in this chapter. First, a model that could
identify relevant products in darkweb/deepweb marketplaces, relevant topics on forum
post containing communication relevant to malicious hacking, and relevant references to
marketplaces and forums in subreddits (subreddits are forums in which information relating
to forums and marketplaces are discussed - this can be viewed as meta-content). The
second problem is identifying new relevant marketplaces/forums. All the problems are
binary classification problems with the data sample being relevant or not. We look at both
supervised and semi-supervised approaches to address the first classification problem and
topic modeling for the second. We now provide an overview of the approaches used and
then discuss the classification challenges associated with each problem. For supervised
approaches we use standard machine learning techniques discussed in Section 2.3.
5.4.1 Semi-supervised Approaches
Labeling data is expensive and often requires expert knowledge. Semi-supervised
approaches work with limited labeled data by leveraging information from unlabeled data.
We discuss popular semi-supervised approaches used in this work.
Label propagation (LP). The label propagation approach [139] has been widely used for
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semi-supervised classification task [11, 67, 133, 27]. It estimates the label values based
on graph Laplacian [9] where the model is represented by a weighted graph G = (V,E) ,
where V indicates the vertices representing the samples , while the edges E are the weights
indicating the similarity between points. A subset of these vertices are labeled and these
vertices are then used to estimate the labels of the remaining under the assumption that
the edges are able to capture the similarity between samples. Hence the performance of
these methods depends on the similarity measure used. The most commonly used similarity
measures include k-NN and Guassian kernel.
Co-training (CT). The Co-training approach was proposed by Blum and Mitchell [13]. In
this approach the feature set is divided into two sets (assumed to be independent), and two
classifiers are trained using the limited labeled set denoted by L . These trained classifiers
are then used to estimate the labels for the unlabeled points. High confidence label estimates
from classifier-1 are added to the labeled set L of classifier-2 and vice versa. For the current
setting we set the confidence to 70%. Every time the labeled set L is updated, the classifiers
are retrained. This procedure repeats until all of the unlabeled points are labeled. It can
be viewed as two classifiers teaching each other. For this approach to work, it is necessary
that the two classifiers are uncorrelated and are able to make independent decisions. We
implement this idea of using multiple classifiers to gain two different viewpoints of the
same data. We implement the co-training algorithm using different classifiers discussed in
Section 2.3 to determine the best performing approach.
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). Additionally, we use LDA, to engineer features in
some cases. Latent Dirichlet Allocation is an unsupervised modeling technique. The
goal is to infer topics that maximize the likelihood (posteriori probability) of positive
webpages. Each webpage has the same set of topics distribution over topics is individually
determined for each. The topic proportions are drawn from Dirichlet distribution. These
topic distributions can be used as features for classification. The features are limited to the
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topics and thus LDA can be used as a dimensionality reduction technique [12].
5.4.2 Experiments: Marketplaces
The recent growth in popularity of darkweb marketplaces provides a new avenue to
gather information about the cyber threat landscape. As stated earlier, these marketplaces
often sell goods and services that do not relate to malicious hacking, including drugs,
pornography, weapons and software services. Only a small fraction of products (13%) are
related to malicious hacking. We thus require a model that can separate relevant products
from the non-relevant ones. The data collected from marketplaces is noisy and hence not
suitable to use directly as input to a learning model. Hence, the raw information undergoes
several steps of automated data cleaning. We now discuss the challenges associated with the
dataset obtained and the data processing steps taken to address them. We note that similar
challenges occur for forum and subreddit data.
Classification Challenges
Text Cleaning. Product title and descriptions on marketplaces often have much text that
serves as noise to the classifier (e.g. *****SALE*****). To deal with these instances, we
first removed all non-alphanumeric characters from the title and description. This, in tandem
with standard stop-word removal, greatly improved classification performance.
Misspellings and Word Variations. Misspellings frequently occur on forums and market-
places, which is an obstacle for the standard bag-of-words classification approach. Addition-
ally, with the standard bag-of-words approach, variations of words are considered separately
(e.g. hacker, hack, hackers, etc.). Word stemming mitigates these issue of word variations,
but fails to fix the issue of misspellings. To address this we use character n-gram features.
As an example of character n-gram features, consider the word “hacker”. If we were using
tri-gram character features, the word “hacker” would yield the features “hac”, “ack”, “cke”,
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“ker”. The benefit of this being that the variations or misspellings of the word in the forms
“hack”, “hackz”, “”hackker”, will all have some common features. We found that using
character n-grams in the range (3, 7) outperformed word stemming in our experiments.
Large Feature Space. In standard bag-of-words approach, as opposed to the character n-
gram approach, the feature matrix gets very large as the number of words increase. Consider
the case where the training corpus contains 100,000 unique words and 10,000 documents.
The feature matrix then has 100,000 entries for each document, this means that there are 1
billion entries in the feature matrix. As the number of unique words and documents grow,
this bloated feature matrix begins to greatly degrade performance. Using n-gram features
further increase the already over-sized feature matrix. To address this issue we leveraged
the sparse matrix data structure in the scipy 6 library, which leverages the fact that most of
these over 1 billion entries will be zero. If a word or n-gram feature is not present in a given
document, there is simply no entry for that feature in the sparse matrix. Switching from a
dense matrix representation to a sparse matrix representation greatly reduced runtime, as the
dense matrix representation was hardly tractable for even a few hundred documents.
Preserving Title Feature Context. As the title and description of the product are disjoint,
we found that simply concatenating the description to the product title before extracting
features led to sub-optimal classification performance. We believe that by doing a simple
concatenation, we were losing important contextual information. There were features
that should be interpreted differently should they appear in the title versus the description.
Initially, we used two separate classifiers: one for the title and one for the description. With
this construction, when an unknown product was being classified, we would pass the title to
the title classifier and the description to the description classifier. If either classifier returned
a positive classification, we would assign the product a positive classification. However,
we believe that this again led to the loss of important contextual information. To fix this,
6https://www.scipy.org/
108
we independently extract character n-gram features from the title and description. This
step yields a title feature vector and a description feature vector. We then horizontally
concatenate these vectors, forming a single feature vector which includes separate feature
sets for the title and description.
Results
We consider 10 marketplaces to train and test our learning model. A summary of these
marketplaces is shown in Table 5.3. Table 5.4 gives instance of products defined as being
relevant or not. With the help of security experts we label 25% of the products from each
marketplace. The experimental setup is as follows. We perform a leave-one-marketplace-out
cross-validation. In other words, given n marketplaces we train on n − 1 and test on the
remaining one. We repeat this experiment for all the marketplaces. For the supervised
experiment we only use the 25% labeled data from each marketplace. We evaluate the
performance based primarily on three metrics: precision, recall and unbiased F1. Precision
indicates the fraction of products that were relevant from the predicted ones. Recall is
the fraction of relevant products retrieved. The results are averaged and weighted by the
number of samples in each market. In this application a high recall is desirable as we do
not want to omit relevant products. In the supervised approaches SVM with linear kernel
performed the best, recalling 87% of the relevant products while maintaining a precision of
85% (Fig. 5.4). SVM performed the best likely due to the fact it maximizes generality as
opposed to minimizing error.
As stated, only 25% of the data is labeled, as labeling often requires expert knowledge.
However, this significant cost and time investment can be reduced by applying a semi-
supervised approach which leverages the unlabeled data to aid in classification. It takes
approximately one minute for a human to label 5 marketplace products or 2 topics on forums
as relevant or not, highlighting the costliness of manual labeling. The experimental setup
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Table 5.3: Markets and Number of products collected.
Markets Products
Market-1 439
Market-2 1329
Market-3 455
Market-4 4018
Market-5 876
Markets Products
Market-6 497
Market-7 491
Market-8 764
Market-9 2014
Market-10 600
Table 5.4: Example of Products.
Product Title Relevant
20+ Hacking Tools (Botnets Keyloggers Worms and More!) YES
SQLI DUMPER V 7.0 SQL INJECTION SCANNER YES
Amazon Receipt Generator NO
5 gm Colombian Cocaine NO
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Fig. 5.4: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for NB, LOG-REG, RF and SVM
for product classification.
110
is similar to the supervised approach, but this time we also utilize the large unlabeled data
from each marketplace (75%) for training.
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Fig. 5.5: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for LP, CT-NB, CT-LOG-REG,
CT-RF and CT-SVM for product classification.
Fig. 5.5 shows the performance comparison for the semi-supervised approaches. For the
co-training approach we divide the feature space into two sets. The two feature sets used
are both based on character n-grams. However, the set of words from which the character
n-grams are derived are disjoint between the two sets. In this way, the two corresponding
feature vectors can be treated as being independent from one another. Hence we get two
views of the same sample. Co-training with Linear SVM is able to recall 92% of the
relevant products as compared to label propagation and other variants of co-training while
maintaining a precision of 82%, which is desirable. In this case, the unlabeled data aided the
classification in improving the recall to 92% without significantly reducing the precision.
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5.4.3 Experiment: Forums
In addition to the darkweb/deepweb marketplaces that we have already discussed, there
are also numerous darkweb forums on which users will not only discuss on malicious
hacking related topics. Again, there is the issue that only a fraction of these topics with posts
on these forums contain information that is relevant to malicious hacking or the trading of
exploits. hence, we need a classifier to identify relevant topics. This classification problem
is very similar to the product classification problem previously discussed, with similar set of
challenges.
We performed evaluation on an English forum and a Russian forum. For the English
forum we considered a dataset of 781 topics with 5373 posts. Table 5.5 gives instance of
topics defined as being relevant or not. We label 25% of the topics and perform a 10-fold
cross validation using supervised methods. We show the results from the top two performing
supervised and semi-supervised methods. In the supervised setting, LOG-REG performed
the best with 80% precision and 68% recall (Fig. 5.6). On the other hand, leveraging
unlabeled data in a semi-supervised technique improved the recall while maintaining the
precision. We note that in this case the 10-fold cross validation was performed only on the
labeled points. In the semi-supervised domain co-training with LOG-REG improved the
recall to 80% with precision of 78%.
Table 5.5: Example of Topics.
Topic Relevant
Bitcoin Mixing services YES
Hacking service YES
I can vend cannabis where should I go? NO
Looking for MDE/MDEA shipped to Aus NO
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Fig. 5.6: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for LOG-REG, SVM, CT-LOG-
REG, and CT-SVM for English forum topic classification.
We also encounter forums in languages other than English. Many of the non-English
forums like Russian use English words to describe hacking techniques and exploits (e.g.
“RAT”, and “botnet”). Hence, we use the same character n-gram features for the Russian
forum too. For evaluation we consider a Russian forum with 1609 topics comprising of
8961 posts. We had 25% of the topics labeled by a Russian speaking security analyst. The
experimental setup is similar to English forums. The comparison is shown in Fig. 5.7.
We note that supervised methods do better than semi-supervised methods in this setting.
LOG-REG has the best recall of 58% with 60% precision. We are exploring a combination
of machine learning and keyword filtering to improve the performance on foreign language
forums.
5.4.4 Experiment: Subreddits
We also crawl data from subreddits where discussion is focused on darkweb and deepweb
websites. But, just as in the case of marketplaces/forum, not all subreddit posts are relevant
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Fig. 5.7: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for NB, LOG-REG, CT-LOG-REG
and CT-SVM for Russian forum topic classification.
to malicious hacking. Thus, we need a classifier to identify the relevant ones. For evaluating
the model we consider 1550 topics with around 8000 posts from 33 subreddits. We consider
the topic to be relevant if atleast one of the posts in the topic is relevant. We label 25% of the
topics. Using these labeled samples we perform a 10-fold cross validation and average the
results. Fig. 5.8 shows the two best performing supervised methods (NB and LOG-REG).
Naive Bayes is able to recall 68% of the relevant subreddits with a precision of 53%.
On the other hand, leveraging unlabeled data in a semi-supervised technique improves
precision while maintaining the recall. Fig. 5.8 shows the two best performing semi-
supervised methods (CT-LOG-REG and CT-SVM) in comparison with the supervised
methods. Here, the 10-fold cross validation is performed only on the labeled points. Co-
training with linear SVM performs the best with an average precision of 74%, recalling 68%
of the subreddits. Hence, again it provides a significant performance increase in precision.
As with the marketplace classifier, we used two feature vectors of character n-grams derived
from two disjoint sets of words.
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Fig. 5.8: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for LP, CT-LOG-REG, CT-RF and
CT-SVM for subreddits.
5.4.5 Darknet New Page Discovery
The crawler often encounters new web links while crawling data from forums and
subreddits. These new links might point to new marketplaces or forums relating to malicious
hacking. We want to automate the process of determining whether or not a given new
web-page is relevant to our data collection efforts. For the previous classification problems
we were able to rely on the structure of the input. That is, in the case of the product classifier
we knew that we were receiving only a product title and description. In the case of the
forum/subreddit classifier we had a thread title and the post content. This classification
problem is different. The input is a single HTML page, the structure of which is completely
unknown. The classifier then has to determine if the page is relevant or not. Without any
assumption on structure, it is very difficult to extract only the parts of the page that are
relevant. In the pre-processing step we extract all visible text on the page (including header,
footer, sidebar, menu etc.).
In our first approach, we used a bag-of-words approach with TF-IDF (term frequency
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- inverse document frequency) on the extracted text (i.e. all visible text on the webpage).
Using this approach, when given two pages from the same web site, both pages will have an
identical header, footer, sidebar, menu, etc. One difficulty here was that the term frequencies
of the words in the header, footer, etc. are not necessarily that important for classification.
This generates a lot of noise in the feature space. With TF-IDF-based features, we found
that the classifiers greatly overfit to the pages that were in the positive training set. As a
result, pages from new sites were nearly always classified as negative – regardless of content.
To help mitigate the problem of overfitting models to sites in the training set, we used the
topic-distribution generated by Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [12] as features, rather
than TF-IDF or bag-of-words, which greatly improved performance on an independent
evaluation set. In our ongoing work, we are examining additional features beyond those
based on text.
Results
For training our model, we use all the positive webpages from marketplaces and forums
already identified as relevant by an analyst. The negative pages were gathered by an analyst
during their search for relevant darkweb and deepweb websites. Using all of the labeled
pages as a training set we trained two Linear SVM models, one with TF-IDF features and
one with LDA topic distribution features, with word stemming done for both the models.
To evaluate the models, a security analyst provided us with a list of links. The links were
crawled, yielding 2855 HTML pages with unknown content. Hence, the evaluation described
in this section was a true validation set. Our focus is on precision with the intuition that the
classifier can point out a relatively small number of pages that are likely to be relevant to the
analyst.
TF-IDF-Based Results. When using standard TF-IDF as features, only 35 pages were
classified as relevant and, of them, only 3 unique sites were represented, two of which were
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deemed irrelevant by an analyst and the third site having pages that appeared in the training
set. Using TF-IDF as features yielded no pages for new markets.
LDA-Based Results. LDA greatly improved performance on the evaluation set. When
evaluating a Linear SVM model with LDA topic distribution features, trained on the labeled
data, 58 of the 2855 unlabeled pages were given a positive classification. Of the 58 pages,
the analyst deemed 50 of them as relevant to what they typically look for, with seven new
markets represented in the set of 58 pages. This classifier performed far better at extracting
the “market structure,” as nearly all positively classified pages were from darkweb markets.
Once markets have been identified, we can leverage the market product classifier discussed
previously to only extract products relating to malicious hacking. We also note that the LDA
topics themselves are useful to the analyst - especially as topics evolve over time. Table 5.6
shows a sample of the 25 LDA topics that were used in this experiment.
Table 5.6: A sample of Positive Topics.
1. bitcoin, use, address, account, order, contact, email, service, product, please, day, send,
market, new, make, share, time, free, month
2. price, day, ago, item, usd, btc, fix, quantity, buy, view, left, bid, unlimited, software, book,
ms, fraud, secure, exploit
3. service, onion, hidden, tor, bitcoin, forum, wiki, host, link, card, mark0et, directory,
clearnet, site, drug, web, marketplace
5.5 Case Studies
We analyze the data with the purpose of answering the questions raised in the Section 5.1.
We will be using the following key security terms. Vulnerability is a security flaw that
allows an attacker to compromise a software or an operating system. Exploit is a piece of
software that takes advantage of a vulnerability in a piece of software or operating system
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to compromise it. Patch is a piece of software used to improve existing software by fixing
vulnerabilities to improve security. We discuss the following case-studies.
5.5.1 Discovery of Zero-Day Exploits.
Over a 4 week period, we detected 16 zero-day exploits from the marketplace data.
Zero-day exploits leverage vulnerabilities that are unknown to the vendor. Table 5.7 shows
a sample of zero-day exploits with their selling price in Bitcoin. The Android WebView
zero-day affects a vulnerability in the rendering of web pages in Android devices. It affects
devices running on Android 4.3 Jelly Bean or earlier versions of the operating system. This
comprised of more than 60% of the Android devices in 2015. After the original posting of
this zero-day, a patch was released in Android KitKit 4.4 and Lollipop 5.0 which required
devices to upgrade their operating system. As not all users have/will update to the new
operating system, the exploit is continues to be sold for a high price. Detection of these
zero-day exploits at an earlier stage can help organizations avoid an attack on their system
or minimize the damage. For instance, in this case, an organization may decide to prioritize
patching, updating , or replacing certain systems using the Android operating system.
Table 5.7: Example of Zero-day exploits.
Zero-day exploit Price (BTC 7 )
Internet Explorer 11 Remote Code Execution 0day 20.4676
Android WebView 0day RCE 40.8956
Fresh 0day MS Office 38.3436
5.5.2 Exploits targeting known vulnerabilities.
Zero-day vulnerabilities are difficult to discover, hence the zero-day exploits are rare.
But exploits targeting known vulnerabilities often show up on the marketplaces for sale.
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These exploits are advertised to target specific vulnerabilities. Sometimes vendors mention
Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) numbers assigned by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). Using NIST’s National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 8
, we can determine the vulnerability and the target softwares from the CVE number. For
instance, the Silent Doc exploit allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause
a denial of service (memory corruption). It affects Microsoft Word. The severity level
was listed HIGH on this exploit. Exploit kit on the other hand targets many vulnerabilities
and is expensive. The Xer Exploit Kit (Table 5.8) targets 7 vulnerabilities. Also note that
Microsoft also assigns vulnerability numbers for its products with a ”Microsoft Security
Bulletin” (MSB) number. These numbers are sometimes seen as well in marketplace product
descriptions.
Table 5.8: Exploit-Vulnerability.
Exploit Vulnerability
SILENT DOC EXPLOIT CVE-2014-1761
Sqlninja CVE-2010-0232
Xer Exploit Kit / traffic / LOADS CVE-2015-2426, CVE-2015-0313, CVE-2015-0311,
CVE-2014-0556, CVE-2015-0317, CVE-2014-0515,
CVE-2015-2444
5.5.3 Users having presence in markets/ forums.
Previous studies on darkweb crawling [41, 10] explore a single domain, namely forums.
We create a social network that includes both types of information studied in this chapter:
marketplaces and forums. We can thus study and find these cross-site connections that were
previously unstudied. We are able to produce this connected graph using the “usernames”
8https://nvd.nist.gov/home.cfm
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used by vendors and users in each domain. A subgraph of this network containing some of
the individuals who are simultaneously selling products related to malicious hacking and
publishing in hacking related forums is shown in Fig. 5.9. In most cases the vendors are
trying to advertise/discuss their products on the forums, demonstrating their expertise. Using
these integrated graphic representations, one can visualize the individuals’ participation
in both domains, making the right associations that lead to a better comprehension of the
malicious hacker networks. It is helpful in determining social groups within the forums of
user interaction. The presence of users on multiple markets and forums follows a power
law. From Fig. 5.10, majority of users only belong to a single market or forum. We note
that there are 751 users that are present in more than two platforms. Fig. 5.11 considers one
such user/vendor. The vendor is active in 7 marketplaces and 1 forum . The vendor offers 82
malicious hacking related products and discusses these products on the forum. The vendor
has an average rating of 4.7/5.0, rated by customers on the marketplace with more than 7000
successful transactions, indicating the reliability of the products and the popularity of the
vendor.
Fig. 5.9: Vendor/User network in marketplace and forum.
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Fig. 5.11: A centric network of a Vendor.
5.6 Related Work
Web crawling is a popular way of collecting large amounts of data from the Internet. In
many applications researchers are interested in specific topics for their application. Hence
the need for a topic-based crawler popularly referred to as a focused crawler [24, 23]. Most
of the focused crawlers are designed to collect information from the surface web with little
concentration on the darkweb websites. More recently a focused crawler concentrating
on dark web forums was designed [41]. This research primarily concentrated on forums,
collecting data over a period of time and then performing static analysis to study online
communities. The authors also describe different data mining techniques for these forums
in [26]. We, on the other hand, not only look at darkweb forums but also collect information
from marketplaces hosting a range of products relating to malicious hacking.
Additionally, web-crawlers have been developed to aid law enforcement to track online
extremist activities [82]. This work has included the use of a self-guided web-crawler
using sentiment analysis to identify extremist content, threats to critical infrastructure [75]
and online sexual child exploitation [135]. Another application of leveraging darkweb
information to counter human trafficking is developed by DARPA through the Memex
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program 9 - a program with different goals than the work described in this chapter.
Previous work leverages the exploit information from marketplaces in a game theoretic
framework to formulate system configurations that minimize the potential damage of a
malicious cyber attack [104]. Other work suggests that hacker communities can be analyzed
to aid in detection to reveal existing and emerging threats. Threats that pose great risk to
individuals, businesses, and government [10]. It further states that knowledge is distributed
in forums. That minimally skilled people could learn enough by simply frequenting such
platforms. This behavior is widespread geopolitically (namely across US, China, Russia, the
Middle-East). Studying these hacker communities gives insights in the social relationships.
Also, the distribution of information amongst users in these communities based on their skill
level and reputation [52, 57, 50]. These forums also serve as markets where malware and
stolen personal information are shared/ sold [51]. Samtani et al. analyze hacker assets in
underground forums [108]. They discuss the dynamics and nature of sharing of tutorials,
source code, and “attachments” (e.g. e-books, system security tools, hardware/software).
Tutorials appear to be the most common way of sharing resources for malicious attacks.
Source code found on these particular forums was not related to specific attacks. Mostly
general, SQL-related (suggesting targets like databases of banks). Additionally underground
forums have also been analyzed to captures the dynamic trust relationships forged between
mutually distrustful parties [84]. They analyze six different underground clearnet forums -
examining the properties of the social networks formed within. The content of the goods and
services being exchanged. Lastly, how individuals gain and lose trust in these underground
forums. These applications gather information from the clearnet to test their theories. Less
effort is put towards analyzing darkweb information given the challenges in gathering
information from the darkweb. Additionally, our focus in this work is on the unique
characteristics of forums and markets supporting malicious hacking in particular - not
9https://opencatalog.darpa.mil/MEMEX.html
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general illicit activities.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we implement a system for intelligence gathering related to malicious
hacking. We consider social platforms on darkweb and deepweb for data collection. We
address various design challenges to develop a focused crawler using data mining and
machine learning techniques. We transitioned this system to a commercial partner to
increase the scale of data collection and maintain the system. The constructed database
is made available to security professionals in order to identify emerging cyber-threats and
capabilities as demonstrated by the application in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
AT-RISK SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION VIA ANALYSIS OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE
DARKWEB
6.1 Introduction
Adequate assessment of threats to systems is a central aspect of a mature security policy—
identifying systems that are at-risk can help defend against potential cyber attacks. Currently,
organizations rely on the rating system (CVSS score) provided by The National Institute of
Science and Technology that maintains a comprehensive list of publicly disclosed vulnera-
bilities in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD [86]) to identify if their systems are at
risk. Case studies have shown poor correlation between the CVSS score and the likelihood
that a vulnerability on a system will be targeted by hackers [2]. Hence, organizations are
constantly looking for ways to proactively identify if their vulnerable systems are of interest
to hackers.
Table 6.1: System components and examples
Components Explanation and Examples
Platform Can be either hardware (h), operating system (o), or application
(a) based on what the vulnerability exploits.
Vendor The owner of the vulnerable product. Examples include Google,
Microsoft, The Mozilla Foundation, and the University of Oxford.
Product The product that is vulnerable. Examples include Internet Explorer,
Java Runtime Environment, Adobe Reader, and Windows 2000.
Threat intelligence from darkweb (D2web) has been leveraged to predict whether or
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not a vulnerability mention on D2web will be exploited [4, 3]. This method only considers
hacker discussions that have a CVE number mentioned in them—a limitation of the approach
is therefore that discussions with no vulnerability identifiers (CVE) that are of interest to
threat actors are not taken into account. In this chapter, we propose to leverage this threat
intelligence gathered from D2web markets and forums to identify the systems that might
be of interest to threat actors. We identify systems based on the structured naming scheme
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE [31]). We focus our efforts towards identifying the
first three system components of the CPE naming scheme; Table 6.1 shows these three
components, with examples for each.
We design a system that leverages threat intelligence (hacker discussions) and makes
a decision regarding at-risk systems, at the same time providing arguments as to why a
particular decision was made. It explores multiple competing hypotheses (in this case
multiple platforms, vendors, products) based on the discussions for and against a particular
at-risk component. The resulting system is a hybrid that combines DeLP with machine
learning classifiers. Previously, a similar reasoning system was employed for attributing
cyber-attacks to responsible threat actors in chapter 4 evaluated on a capture-the-flag dataset
in chapter 3.
In this chapter:
• We frame identifying at-risk systems as a multi-label classification problem, and apply
several machine learning approaches to compare their performance. We find that large
number of possible label choices for vendors and products with less representation in
training account for the majority of the misclassified samples.
• To address misclassification, we propose a hybrid reasoning framework that com-
bines machine learning techniques with defeasible argumentation to reduce the set of
possible labels for each system component. The reasoning framework can provide
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arguments supporting the decisions, indicating why a particular system was identi-
fied over others; this is an important aspect, supporting a security analyst in better
understanding the result.
• We report on experiments showing that the reduced set of labels used in conjunction
with the classifiers leads to significant improvement in precision (15%-57%) while
maintaining comparable recall.
6.1.1 Vulnerability related terms
Vulnerability is a flaw in a system (software/hardware) that makes the system vulnerable
to attacks compromising the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the system to cause
harm [99].
CVE: Common vulnerability enumeration (CVE) is a unique identifier assigned to a system
vulnerability reported to NIST [32]. NIST maintains a database of all the vulnerabilities pub-
licly available in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD [86]). Predicting exploitability
of a CVE is an important problem and recent work leveraging darkweb data has shown good
performance in achieving that goal [4, 3]. But these techniques reply on direct mentions
of CVE’s. We Note that a very small portion of hacker discussions in the data from the
commercial provider has direct CVE mentions.
CPE: Common platform enumeration (CPE) is a list of software / hardware products that
are vulnerable for a given CVE. NIST makes this data available for each vulnerability in
its database. Identifying at-risk systems in terms of its components (see Table 6.1) is an
important step towards predicting if those systems will be targeted by threat actors (in
cases where the hacker discussion is not associated with a CVE number). For the system
components under consideration, there exists a hierarchy starting from the platform to
vendor to product. For instance, if we are considering operating systems, then there are
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Fig. 6.1: Reasoning System
limited number of vendors that provide it: Microsoft, Apple, Google, etc. If we identify
Microsoft as our vendor, then the products are related to the Windows operating system.
This hierarchy helps us to narrow down possible choices as we go down the hierarchy.
6.2 System Overview
Fig. 6.1 gives an overview of the reasoning system; it consists of the following three
main modules:
• Knowledge Base: Our knowledge base consists of hacker discussions from darkweb
(D2web) forums and marketplaces collected in chapter 5. This data is maintained and
made available through APIs by a commercial darkweb threat intelligence provider
1 . The database is collected from 302 websites 2 . We use the hacker discussions
in terms of posted content (from forums) and item descriptions (from markets), the
website it is posted on, and the user posting the discussion as inputs to both the
1Cyber Reconnaissance, Inc. (CRY3CON), https://www.cyr3con.com.
2At the time of writing
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argumentation and machine learning models. We also input the CPE hierarchy from
NVD to the argumentation model. We discuss and provide further analysis of the data
in Section 2.2. For the experiment, we sort the dataset by time (depending on when
the discussion was posted); the first 80% is reserved for training (knowledge base)
and the remaining 20% for testing. We follow similar time split to compute the CPE
hierarchy as well.
• Argumentation Model: This component constructs arguments for a given query (at-
risk system component) using elements in the knowledge base. We use a formalism
called DeLP that combines logic programming with defeasible argumentation. It is
made up of three constructs: facts: observations from the knowledge base that cannot
be contradicted; strict rules: logical combinations of facts that are always true; and
defeasible rules: can be thought of as strict rules but are only true if no contradictory
evidence is present. We discuss the argumentation framework with examples for each
of the constructs in Section 3.3. Arguments help reduce the set of possible choices for
platforms, vendors and products; this reduced set of possible system components acts
as one of the inputs to the machine learning model. The argumentation model thus
constrains the machine learning model to identify the system from the reduced set of
possible platforms, vendors, and products.
• Machine Learning Model: The machine learning model takes the knowledge base
and query as input, along with the reduced set of possible system components from the
argumentation model, and provides a result identifying the system. It is constrained
by the argumentation model to select the components from the reduced platform,
vendor and product set, which aids the machine learning model (improving precision)
as demonstrated in the results section of the chapter. We use text-based features
extracted from the discussions (TF-IDF/Doc2Vec) for the machine learning model.
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Any standard machine learning model can be used in this module. We provide a
comparison of different machine learning models to select the best one.
6.3 Dataset
6.3.1 D2web data
We use D2web data supplied by a threat intelligence company collected in chapter 5. The
data is accessed via APIs. The data is comprised of forum discussions and marketplace items
offered for sale in D2web. Exploration of D2web discussions in terms of their structure,
content and behavior of users who post these discussions is reported in [112]. The data is
collected periodically to obtain time-based information indicating changes in the forums and
marketplaces. To ensure collection of cyber-security relevant data, machine learning models
are employed that filter the data related to drugs, weapons, and other irrelevant discussions.
Table 6.2 shows the characteristics for the websites, posts/items, and users. The data is
comprised from websites with different languages. A single website might have discussions
in different languages. Fig. 6.2 shows the percentage of total websites from the D2web for
the top ten languages used to post discussions Majority of the websites have discussions
in English (73%), with other languages having an even distribution. The commercial data
collection platform automatically identifies the language and translates it to English using
the Google Translate API [46].
Ground Truth. In order to evaluate the performance of the reasoning framework, we need
ground truth associated with the hacker discussions. To obtain ground truth we consider
discussions from forums and marketplaces that mention a CVE number. From the CVE
number we can look up the vulnerable systems using the NVD; we note that for both training
and testing we remove the CVE number while computing features. Table 6.2 shows the
characteristics for the websites, posts/items, and users that mention a CVE number. The
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Fig. 6.2: Percentage of total websites belonging to the top ten languages in the D2web data.
Table 6.2: Characteristics of D2web data
Number of D2web websites 302
Number of unique users 635,163
Number of unique posts / items 6,277,638
Number of D2web websites (CVE mentions) 135
Number of unique users (CVE mentions) 3,361
Number of unique posts / items (CVE mentions) 25,145
hacker discussion with CVE mentions belong to 135 websites posted by 3361 users. On
analyzing the CVE mentions most of the older vulnerabilities target products that are no
longer in use. For that reason in our experiments we consider CVE discussions posted
after 2013 (starting 01/01/2014). These discussion make up around 70% of the total CVE
discussions.
CPE Hierarchy. We compute the hierarchy for all the vulnerable systems from all the
vulnerabilities disclosed in NVD [86], and maintain it as a dictionary to build arguments on
top of it. Fig. 6.3 shows a subset of the built hierarchy with the three system components
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(platform, vendor and product).
Website/User preference. We compute and maintain a list of system components discussed
for each website and user. This lets us know if a particular website is preferred by hackers
to discuss specific at-risk systems. The user list gives us the preference of the user regarding
what at-risk systems are of interest to him/her.
Overall in our dataset, for platforms most discussions pose a threat to operating systems
(57%), following by applications (43%) and hardware makes up a small fraction of the
discussions (3%). There are discussions that pose a risk to multiple platforms i.e. operating
systems and application or in few instances all three. For vendors, the top five at-risk based
on CVE mentions in the hacker discussions: Microsoft (24%), Linux (9%), Apple (6%),
Oracle (5%), Adobe (5%). Similar to platforms discussions can pose a risk to multiple
vendors. For products the distribution is more even since a single vendor can have multiple
products. Even though Microsoft dominates the vendor discussion, it also has the most
number of products that are at risk. The top five at-risk products based on CVE mentions
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in the hacker discussions: Windows server (5%), Windows 8.1 (4%), Linux kernel (3.8%),
Mac OSX (2.3%), Flash player (1.9%).
6.4 Argumentation Model
Our approach relies on a model of the world where we can analyze competing hypotheses.
Such a model allows for contradictory information so it can handle inconsistency in the data
similar to the one employed for attributing cyber-attacks to responsible threat actors [115,
94].
Before describing the argumentation model in detail, we introduce some necessary
notation (similar to be one used in chapter 3). Variables and constant symbols represent
items such as the platform/vendor/product at-risk by the discussion and post/webID/userID
represent the hacker discussion, where it was posted and who posted it respectively (we note
that for privacy concerns the webID/userID is represented as an integer in the data provided
by the APIs—the names are not disclosed). We denote the set of all variable symbols with
V and the set of all constants with C. For our model we require six subsets of C:
• Cpost denoting the hacker discussion,
• Cweb , denoting the websites (both forums and marketplaces) where the hacker discus-
sion was posted,
• Cuser , denoting the users who posts hacker discussions, and
• Cplatform , Cvendor , Cproduct denoting the three components at-risk by the discussion
(see Table 6.1).
We use symbols in all capital letters to denote variables. In the running example, we use a
subset of the D2web dataset collected by the threat intelligence company.
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Table 6.3: Example predicates and explanation
Predicate Explanation
posted(post1, webID1) post1 was posted on the website webID1.
at risk(D,Y) Post D discussed vendor Y being at-risk.
user preference (userID1,microsoft) userID1 prefers to post discussions regarding
Microsoft systems at-risk.
previously seen (webID1, adobe flash) At-risk discussions regarding Adobe Flash are
discussed in webID1.
parent(microsoft, safari) Vendor Microsoft is a parent of product Safari.
Example 5. The following system and post/web/user information will be used in the running
example:
Cpost = {post1, post2, ..., postn}
Cweb = {webID1,webID2, ...,webIDn}
Cuser = {userID1, userID2, ..., userIDn}
Cplatform = {h, o, a}
Cvendor = {microsoft, google, the mozilla foundation}
Cproduct = {internet explorer, windows 10, adobe reader}
The language also contains a set of predicate symbols that have constants or vari-
ables as arguments, and denote events that can be either true or false. We denote the
set of predicates with P; examples of predicates are shown in Table 6.3. For instance,
user preference(userID1,microsoft) will either be true or false, and denotes the event where
userID1 prefers to post discussions regarding microsoft systems at-risk.
A ground atom is composed by a predicate symbol and a tuple of constants, one for each
argument—hence, ground atoms have no variables. The set of all ground atoms is denoted
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with G. A ground literal L is either a ground atom or a negated ground atom. An example
of a ground atom for our running example is posted(post1, webID1). In the following, we
will use G′ to denote a subset of G.
Defeasible Logic Programming: DeLP is a formalism that combines logic programming
with defeasible argumentation; we refer the interested reader to [42] for a fully detailed
presentation of the system. The formalism is summarized in chapter 3 (see Section 3.3)
along with the three constructs, namely facts, strict rules, and defeasible rules. These three
constructs are used to build arguments, and DeLP programs are simply sets of facts, strict
rules and defeasible rules. We adopt the usual notation for DeLP programs, denoting the
program (or knowledge base) with Π = (Θ,Ω,∆), where Θ is the set of facts, Ω is the set
of strict rules, and ∆ is the set of defeasible rules. Examples of the three constructs are
provided with respect to the dataset in Fig. 6.4. We now describe the notation used to denote
these constructs. We reiterate the definitions of the three constructs.
Facts (Θ) are ground literals that represent atomic information or its (strong) negation (¬).
Strict Rules (Ω) represent cause and effect information; they are of the form L0 ← L1, ...Ln,
where L0 is a literal and {Li}i>0 is a set of literals.
Defeasible Rules (∆) are weaker versions of strict rules, and are of the form L0 -≺
L1, ...., Ln, where L0, is the literal and {Li}i>0 is a set of literals.
When a hacker discussion happens on D2web, the model can be used to derive arguments
to determine the at-risk system (in terms of platform, vendor, and product). Derivation
follows the same mechanism as classical logic programming [73]; the main difference
is that DeLP incorporates defeasible argumentation, which decides which arguments are
warranted, which arguments are defeated, and which arguments should be considered to be
blocked—the latter are arguments that are involved in a conflict for which a winner cannot
be determined.
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Fig. 6.4 shows a ground argumentation framework demonstrating constructs derived
from our D2web data. For instance, θ1 indicates the fact that a hacker discussion post1 was
posted on the D2web website webID1, and θ5 indicates that user userID1 prefers to post
discussions regarding apple products. For the strict rules, ω1 says that for a given post post1
posing a threat to operating system (o), the vendor sandisk cannot be at risk if the parent of
sandisk is not operating system (o) 3 . Defeasible rules can be read similarly; δ2 indicates
that if post1 poses a threat to the vendor apple, the product safari can be at-risk if apple
is the parent of safari. By replacing the constants with variables in the predicates we can
derive a non-ground argumentation framework that can be applied in general.
The following examples discuss arguments for our scenario.
Example 6. Fig. 6.5 shows example arguments based on the KB from Fig. 6.4; here,
〈A3,
at risk(post1, apple)
〉
is a subargument of
〈A2, at risk(post1, safari)〉.
We engineer our at-risk system framework as a set of defeasible and strict rules whose
structure was created manually, but are dependent on values learned from a historical corpus
of D2web data. Then, for a given post discussing a vulnerability, we instantiate a set of
facts for that situation; this information is then provided as input into the DeLP system,
which uses heuristics to generate all arguments for and against every possible components
of the system (platforms, vendors, products) for the post discussion. Dialectical trees based
on these arguments are analyzed, and a decision is made regarding which components are
warranted. This results in a reduced set of potential choices, which we then use as input
into a classifier to obtain the at-risk system. The following section discusses these steps in
full detail.
3This encodes the CPE hierarchical structure.
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Θ : θ1 = posted(post1,webID1)
θ2 = posted(post1, userID1)
θ3 = parent(o,microsoft)
θ4 = parent(apple, safari)
θ5 = user preference(userID1, apple)
θ6 = previously seen(webID1, o)
Ω : ω1 = ¬ at risk(post1, sandisk)← at risk(post1, o),
¬parent(o, sandisk)
ω2 = ¬ at risk(post1, internet explorer)← at risk(post1, apple),
¬parent(apple, internet explorer)
∆ : δ1 = at risk(post1,microsoft) -≺ at risk(post1, o),
parent(o,microsoft)
δ2 = at risk(post1, safari) -≺ at risk(post1, apple),
parent(apple, safari)
δ3 = at risk(post1, apple) -≺ user preference(userID1, apple)
δ4 = at risk(post1, o) -≺ previously seen(webID1, o)
Fig. 6.4: A ground argumentation framework.
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〈A1, at risk(post1,microsoft) 〉 A1 = {δ1, δ4, θ3}
〈A2,at risk(post1, safari) 〉 A2 = {δ2, δ3, θ4}
〈A3, at risk(post1, apple)〉 A3 = {δ3, θ5}
〈A4, at risk(post1, o)〉 A4 = {δ4, θ6}
Fig. 6.5: Example ground arguments from Fig. 3.2.
6.5 Experiments
We frame the identification of at-risk systems as a multi-label classification problem
for each of the system component (platform, vendor, and product)—the basic step involves
extracting textual features from the discussions to be used as input to the machine learning
models. We now describe the data pre-processing steps and the standard machine learning
approaches, along with the metrics used for evaluating the models.
6.5.1 Data Representation
As mentioned above, we use text-based features to represent the hacker discussions on
the D2web, which are then used as input to the machine learning models. Some of the
discussions are in foreign languages (cf. Fig. 6.2). The commercial data collection platform
automatically identifies the language and translates it to English using the Google Translate
API [46]. The following pre-processing steps are taken to address different challenges. We
employ two feature engineering techniques namely TF-IDF and Doc2Vec.
Text Cleaning. We remove all non-alphanumeric characters from hacker discussions. This
removes any special characters that do not contribute towards making the decision.
Misspellings and Word Variations. Misspellings and word variations are frequently ob-
served in the discussions on the D2web, leading to separate features in the feature vector
if a standard bag-of-words (BOW) approach is used. In BOW, we create a dictionary of
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all the word occurrences in the training set; then, for a particular discussion, the feature
vector is created by looking up which words have occurred and their count in the discussion.
Misspellings and word variations will thus be represented as different words; to address this,
we use character n-gram features. As an example, consider the word “execute”—if we were
using tri-gram character features, the word “execute” would yield the set of features:
{“exe”,“xec”,“ecu”,“cut”,“ute”}.
The benefit of this technique is that the variations or misspellings of the word, such as
“execution”, “executable”, or “”exxecute”, will all have common features. We found that
using character n-grams in the range 3–7 worked best in our experiments.
TF-IDF Features. We vectorize the n-gram features using the term frequency-inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF) model, which creates a vocabulary of all the n-grams in the
discussion. In TF-IDF, the importance of an n-gram feature increases with the number of
times it occurs, but is normalized by the total number of n-grams in the description. This
eliminates common words from being important features. We consider the top 1,000 most
frequent features (using more than 1,000 features did not improve the performance, but
rather only added to the training and testing time).
Doc2Vec Features. Doc2Vec is a feature engineering technique to generate document
vector (in our case document refers to a discussion), which acts as input to the classifier
to identify at-risk systems. In Doc2Vec, first, a vector representation of each word in the
document in computed by taking into account the words around it (to maintain context) and
then these word vectors are averaged to get a representation of the document. We implement
Doc2Vec using the gensim library in Python 4 . It was been previously used to classify
tweets [128] as well as product descriptions [66].
4https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/models/doc2vec.html
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6.5.2 Supervised Learning Approaches
We conducted our experiments using the following standard machine learning approaches
implemented using Python machine learning library 5 discussed in Section 2.3.
6.5.3 Evaluation Metrics
In our experiments, we evaluate performance based on three metrics: precision, recall,
and F1 measure. For a given hacker discussion, precision is the fraction of labels (platforms,
vendors, or products) that the model associated with the discussion that were actual labels
in the ground truth. Recall, on the other hand, is the fraction of ground truth labels identified
by the model. The F1 measure is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. In our results,
we report the average precision, recall, and F1 for all the test discussions.
6.5.4 Baseline Model (BM)
For the baseline model, we only leverage the machine learning technique to identify the
at-risk systems. We create training and testing sets by sorting the discussions by posted time
on the website (to avoid temporal intermixing). We reserve the first 80% of the samples
for training and the rest (20%) for testing. We employed both TF-IDF and Doc2Vec as
feature engineering techniques. On conducting the experiments, it was observed that TF-IDF
performed better than Doc2Vec in all the experiments. Hence we only report the results
using TF-IDF features.
Results. Table 6.4 shows the average performance of the machine learning technique for
each component of the at-risk system. For platform identification, SVM performs the best
with the following averages:
• precision: 0.72,
5http://scikit-learn.org/stable/
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Table 6.4: Average Precision, Recall, and F1 measure for NB, LOG-REG, DT, RF and SVM
to identify at-risk systems.
Component Model Precision Recall F1 measure
Platform
NB 0.68 0.65 0.66
LOG-REG 0.72 0.76 0.74
DT 0.66 0.70 0.68
RF 0.70 0.75 0.72
SVM 0.72 0.78 0.76
Vendor
NB 0.37 0.34 0.36
LOG-REG 0.28 0.25 0.27
DT 0.39 0.43 0.41
RF 0.40 0.43 0.41
SVM 0.40 0.48 0.44
Product
NB 0.19 0.14 0.16
LOG-REG 0.20 0.13 0.16
DT 0.22 0.15 0.18
RF 0.22 0.25 0.24
SVM 0.26 0.24 0.25
• recall: 0.78, and
• F1 measure: 0.76.
LOG-REG had similar precision, but lower recall. Similarly, for vendor identification, SVM
performs the best with averages:
• precision: 0.40,
• recall: 0.48, and
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• F1 measure: 0.44,
with RF having similar precision. For platform identification, SVM had the best perfor-
mance:
• precision: 0.28,
• recall: 0.24 (comparable to RF), and
• F1 measure: 0.25.
Since SVM performs consistently better for all three classification problems, moving forward
we use SVM as our machine learning component in the reasoning framework (cf. Fig. 6.1).
6.5.5 Reasoning Framework (RFrame)
As we go down the CPE hierarchy, the number of possible labels for vendors and
products increases largely as the number of discussions representing each label decreases,
thus making learning difficult and decreasing performance. We address this issue by
proposing a set of strict and defeasible rules for platform, vendor, and product identification.
We note that these rules arise from the discussion that is being evaluated and do not require
parameter learning.
We use the notation described in Table 6.5 for defining our constructs (facts, strict rules,
and defeasible rules). We note that facts cannot have variables, only constants (however, to
compress the program for presentation purposes, we use meta-variables in facts). To begin,
we define the facts (see Fig. 6.6): θ1 states that a hacker discussion D was posted on the
D2web websiteW (can be either forum or marketplace), and θ2 states that the user U posted
the discussion. For each level in the CPE hierarchy, we define additional rules discussed as
follows.
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Table 6.5: Notation and Explanations
Notation Explanation
D The hacker discussion (posted on the website) under consideration.
W Website (marketplace or forum) where the hacker discussion was
posted.
Sw, Vw and Pw The set of platforms, vendors and products at-risk by the hacker
discussions previously seen inW under consideration respectively.
U User posting the hacker discussion.
Su, Vu and Pu The set of platforms, vendors and products at-risk by the hacker
discussions previously posted by user U under consideration re-
spectively.
Sp, Vp and Pp The set of platforms, vendors and products identified by the ma-
chine learning model at each level in the hierarchy for hacker
discussions under consideration respectively.
si, vi and pi Each element of the set Sp, Vp and Pp representing a single plat-
form, vendor or product respectively.
Θ : θ1 = posted(D,W)
θ2 = posted(D,U)
Fig. 6.6: Facts defined for each test discussion.
Platform Model. The first level of system identification is identifying the platform that
the hacker discussion is a threat to. We compute previously discussed platforms on D2web
websites under consideration. Similarly, which platform the user under consideration
prefers (based on their previous postings) is also computed. This shows preferred platform
discussions on websites and by users, which can aid the machine learning model in reducing
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For s ∈ Sw:
∆ : δ1 = at risk(D, s) -≺ previously seen(W, s).
For s ∈ Su:
δ2 = at risk(D, s) -≺ user preference(U , s).
Fig. 6.7: Defeasible rules for platform identification.
the number of platforms it can identify from. The DeLP components that model platform
identification are shown in Fig. 6.7. For the defeasible rules, δ1 indicates that all the
platforms Sw previously seen in the D2web websiteW where the current discussion D is
observed are likely at-risk, δ2 indicates that all the platforms Su from user U’s previous
postings are also likely at-risk.
Vendor Model. The second level is identifying the at-risk vendor. For this case, we use the
platform result from the previous model, taking that as a DeLP fact. The DeLP components
that model vendor identification are shown in Fig. 6.8. Here, the fact θ1 indicates the
platform identified for the discussion—note that multiple platforms may be identified based
on the discussion. The strict rule ω1 states that for a given post D posing a threat to platform
s, the vendor vi cannot be at-risk if the parent of vi is not the identified platform s. This rule
is based on the CPE hierarchy obtained from NVD. For the defeasible rules, δ1 indicates
that all the vendors Yw previously seen in the D2web websiteW where the current hacker
discussion D is observed are likely at-risk, δ2 indicates that all the vendors Yu from user U ’s
previous postings are also likely at-risk, and δ3 states that for a given post D posing a threat
to platform s, all the vendors whose parent is the identified platform are likely at-risk. This
rule is also based on the CPE hierarchy from NVD.
Product Model. The third level is identifying the at-risk product. For this case, we use
the vendor result from the previous model; as before, we use that as a DeLP fact. The
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For s ∈ Sp:
Θ : θ1 = at risk(D, s)
For s ∈ Sp:
Ω : ω1 = ¬ at risk(D, vi)← at risk(D, s), ¬parent(s, vi)
For v ∈ Yw:
∆ : δ1 = at risk(D, v) -≺ previously seen(W, v).
For v ∈ Yu:
δ2 = at risk(D, v) -≺ user preference(U , v).
For s ∈ Sp:
δ3 = at risk(D, vi)← at risk(D, s), parent(s, vi)
Fig. 6.8: Defeasible rules for vendor identification.
DeLP components that model product identification are shown in Fig. 6.9. Here, the fact θ1
indicates the vendor identified for the discussion—again, multiple vendors may be identified
based on the discussion. The strict rule ω1 states that for a given post D posing a threat to
vendor v, the product pi cannot be at-risk if the parent of pi is not the identified vendor
v (again, based on the CPE hierarchy). For the defeasible rules, δ1 indicates that all the
products Pw previously seen in the D2web websiteW where the current hacker discussion
D is observed are likely at-risk, δ2 indicates that all the products Pu from user U ’s previous
postings are also likely at-risk, and δ3 states that for a given post D posing a threat to vendor
v, all the products whose parent (in the CPE hierarchy) is the identified vendor are likely
at-risk.
Results. We evaluate the reasoning framework using an experimental setup similar to the
one discussed in the baseline model. We report the precision, recall, and F1 measure for
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For v ∈ Yp:
Θ : θ1 = at risk(D, v)
For v ∈ Yp:
Ω : ω1 = ¬ at risk(D,pi)← at risk(D, v), ¬parent(v,pi)
For p ∈ Pw:
∆ : δ1 = at risk(D, p) -≺ previously seen(W, p).
For p ∈ Pu:
δ2 = at risk(D, p) -≺ user preference(U , p).
For v ∈ Yp:
δ3 = at risk(D,pi)← at risk(D, v), parent(v,pi)
Fig. 6.9: Defeasible rules for product identification.
each of the system components and compare them with the best performing baseline model
(BM). Table 6.6 shows the comparison between the two models.
For platform identification, RFrame outperforms BM in terms of precision: 0.83 vs.
0.72 (a 15.27% improvement), while maintaining the same recall. Similarly, for vendor and
product identification there was significant improvement in precision: 0.56 vs. 0.40 (a 40%
improvement) and 0.41 vs. 0.26 (a 57.69% improvement), respectively, with comparable
recall with respect to the baseline model. The major reason for the jump in precision is
the reduction of possible labels based on the arguments introduced that aids the machine
learning model to make the correct decision.
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Table 6.6: Average Precision, Recall, and F1 measure comparison between the baseline
model (BM) and reasoning framework (RFrame).
Component Model Precision Recall F1 measure
Platform
BM 0.72 0.78 0.76
RFrame 0.83 0.78 0.80
Vendor
BM 0.40 0.48 0.44
RFrame 0.56 0.44 0.50
Product
BM 0.26 0.24 0.25
RFrame 0.41 0.21 0.30
6.6 Discussion
The performance of the reasoning system highlights that our hybrid framework identifies
at-risk systems with higher precision with respect to the approach using only machine
learning classifiers. In our application, we desire a high precision—while maintaining at
least comparable recall—in order to provide high value risk assessment of systems; low
precision is often equated to a less reliable framework. The majority of misclassifications
are a result of less data representing those systems in the training set; for some system
components, the instances can be as low as having only one discussion in the training
set. This issue becomes more relevant as we go down the hierarchy with large numbers
of vendors and products. In some test instances, for the same platform and vendor, a new
product not previously known to be at-risk becomes vulnerable due to a newly disclosed
vulnerability. In this case, the reasoning framework is not able to identify the product since
it was not previously observed, and this can contribute to a misclassification.
From a security analyst’s perspective, the reasoning framework not only provides a list of
possible at-risk systems but also provides arguments indicating why a particular system was
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identified as being at-risk. This lets the analyst evaluate the decisions made by the framework
and fine-tune it if necessary. For cases where a new product (not previously discussed in
training) is at-risk, even a partial identification of the system (in terms of platform and
vendor) is of value to the analyst. Based on the alert provided by the framework, the analyst
can manually evaluate the arguments and the discussions to identify possible products,
depending on the platform and vendor identified by the framework.
6.7 Related Work
Threat assessment of systems is critical to organizations’ security policy. Over the
years, CVSS [33] has become a standard metric that organizations use to determine if their
systems are at risk of being targeted by hackers. Unfortunately, case studies have shown
poor correlation between the CVSS score and which system are at-risk [2].
Identifying targeted systems through open source intelligence. Open source intelligence
has been used previously to identify and predict vulnerabilities that are likely to be exploited
to determine which systems are at risk. [138] has looked to predict the likelihood that a
software has a vulnerability not yet discovered using the national vulnerability database
(NVD). They show that NVD has a poor prediction capability in doing so due to limited
amount of information available. On the other hand, [106] looks to predict if a real world
exploit is available based on vulnerabilities disclosed from Twitter data. The authors
report high accuracies of 90% using a resampled, balanced, and temporal mixed dataset,
not reflective of real world scenarios [21]. Identifying threats to critical infrastructure
by analyzing interactions on hacker forums was studied in [76]. Here the authors reply
on keyword based queries to identify such threats from hacker interactions. Tools to
automatically identify products offered in cyber criminal markets was proposed in [100].
This technique looks to extract products mentioned in the description of the item that is
being offered, a problem different than what we address – identifying targeted systems not
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explicitly stated in the forum discussions.
More recently, researchers have shown increased interest on gathering threat intelligence
from D2web to pro-actively identify digital threats and study hacker communities to gather
insights. Researchers have focused on building infrastructure to gather threat information
from markets (regarding goods and services sold) and forums (discussions regarding exploits
and) [90, 103], studying the different product categories offered in darkweb markets –
creating a labeled dataset [79], analyzing hacker forums and carding shops to identify
potential threats [10], identify expert hackers to determine their specialties [1], identify
key hackers based on posted content, their network and since when they are active in the
forum [80]. For vulnerability research, studies look to leverage vulnerability mentions in the
D2web to predict the likelihood of exploitation using a combination of machine learning and
social network techniques [4, 3]. These techniques rely on the mentions of CVE numbers to
identify likely targeted systems (which is a small fraction of vulnerabilities [4]), not taking
into account discussions where a CVE number is not mentioned. On the other hand, we look
to identify the at-risk systems without having a CVE number, which is a different problem
from those tackled in previous work.
Identifying targeted systems through software analysis. Another way of identifying
targeted softwares with vulnerabilities deals with analyzing the software itself in order
to determine which component of the software is most likely to contain a vulnerability.
Mapping past vulnerabilities to vulnerable software components was proposed in [85], where
the authors found that components with function calls and import statements are more likely
to have a vulnerability. A similar method was employed by [111, 131], where text mining
was used to forecast whether a particular software component contains vulnerabilities.
Similar text mining techniques for vulnerability discovery are listed in [43]. The text mining
methods create a count dictionary of terms used in the software, which are used as features
to identify vulnerabilities. These methods suffer from the issue of not knowing which
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vulnerabilities might be of interest to hackers. On the other hand, we work with hacker
discussions posing a threat to systems that are of clearly of interest to hackers since they are
discussing them on the D2web websites—vulnerabilities mentioned on D2web regarding
systems are more likely to be exploited [4].
6.8 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrated how a reasoning framework based on the DeLP struc-
tured argumentation system can be leveraged to improve the performance of identifying
at-risk systems based on hacker discussions on the D2web. DeLP programs built on
discussions found on forums and marketplaces afford a reduction on the set of possible
platforms, vendors, and products that are likely to be at-risk by the hackers participating
in the discussion. This reduction of potential labels leads to better precision while almost
maintaining comparable recall as compared to the baseline model that only leverages ma-
chine learning techniques. Knowing discussed systems by threat actors as possible targets
helps organizations achieve better threat assessment for their systems.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we described three pieces of work to better understand and reason
about the activities of cyber threat actors. This is achieved by covering three factors: the
threat actor’s use of deception, the capabilities available, and the intent of launching the
attack.
In Chapter 2, we considered the problem of cyber-attribution by examining DEFCON
CTF data - which provides us with ground-truth on the culprit responsible for each attack.
We frame cyber-attribution as a classification problem and examine it using several machine
learning approaches. We evaluated the approaches on nearly 10 million attacks from the
CTF data. Random forest achieved the best performance of identifying 37% of the attacking
teams. We find that deceptive attacks – where same exploits are used by multiple teams
to target a particular team, account for the majority of misclassified samples. The usage
of the same exploit creates similar feature representations for different attacking teams -
making it difficult for machine learning approaches. We employ several pruning techniques
to alleviate the misclassification due to deception.
In Chapter 3, we considered the problem of misclassification in a cyber attribution
scenario introduced in Chapter 2. The main source of misclassification was the deceptive
attacks. In this chapter we demonstrate how leveraging Defeasible Logic Programming
(DeLP) in an argumentation-based framework, can be employed to improve cyber-attribution
decisions. This is done by building DeLP programs based on real-world data; this approach
affords a reduction of the set of potential culprits and thus greater accuracy when using a
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classifier for cyber attribution. We thus proposed a hybrid system that integrates argumen-
tation with a machine learning model to make decisions. Using this reasoning framework
the accuracy of identifying the attacking team jumped from 37% to 64.5% – a significant
improvement. The framework also aided a security analyst by providing a set of arguments
as to why a particular team was identified as the attacker and other teams were not.
In Chapter 4, we considered the problem of determination of adversarial intent (tasks)
on the attacked system by analyzing the malware/exploit used in the attack. Specifically,
identifying the tasks (intent) a given piece of malware was designed to perform (e.g., logging
keystrokes, recording video, establishing remote access). We present an automated method
to identify malware tasks using two different approaches based on the ACT-R cognitive
architecture, a popular implementation of a unified theory of cognition. Using three different
malware collections, we explore various evaluations for each of an instance-based and
rule-based model - including cases where the training data differs significantly from test;
where the malware being evaluated employs packing to thwart analytical techniques; and
conditions with sparse training data. Features are constructed by combining both static and
dynamic malware analysis – considering the function call names, network activity, malware
behavior on the host machine and so on. We find that our approach based on cognitive
inference consistently out-performs the current state-of-the art software for malware task
identification as well as standard machine learning approaches - often achieving an unbiased
F1 score of over 0.9. We also show the scaling of the model in terms of test time as the
number of samples grow.
In Chapter 5, we considered the problem of gathering intelligence related to malicious
hacking. We consider social platforms on darkweb and deepweb – in particular hacker
forums and marketplaces, for data collection. We address various design challenges to
develop a focused crawler using data mining and machine learning techniques resulting in
an operational system for identifying emerging cyber threats. At the time of development the
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system was actively collecting approximately 305 cyber threats each week. Since then, we
have transitioned this system to a commercial partner to increase the scale of data collection
and maintenance These threat warnings include information on newly developed malware
and exploits that have not yet been deployed in a cyber-attack, discussions regarding known
vulnerabilities and how they can be exploited, users having presence in multiple platforms
to get better understanding of their social connections. This provides a significant service
to cyber-defenders. The system is significantly augmented through the use of various data
mining and machine learning techniques. With the use of learning models, we are able
to recall 92% of products in marketplaces and 80% of discussions on forums relating to
malicious hacking with high precision.
In Chapter 6, we considered the problem of identifying systems likely to be at-risk by
threat actors to help organizations better defend against likely cyber attacks. We leverage
hacker discussions on darkweb marketplaces and forums collected using the system intro-
duced in Chapter 5 to identify the platforms, vendors, and products likely to be at-risk by
hackers. This gives us an indicator regarding the hacker capability of targeting systems
based on their discussions. We employed and modified the reasoning system introduced
in Chapter 3 that combines DeLP (Defeasible Logic Programming) and machine learning
classifiers to identify systems based on hacker discussions observed on the darkweb. The
modified system takes into account the hierarchical structure of identifying a system in
terms of its platform, vendor and product. The system is evaluated on hacker discussions
from nearly 300 darkweb forums and marketplaces. We improved precision by 15%–57%
while maintaining recall over baseline approaches.
7.2 Future Work
There are a number of interesting future directions for research. Some specific future
work that extends the work in different chapters is discussed below.
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In Chapter 3, we presented a reasoning framework to handle contradictory and incon-
sistent evidence resulting in cases of deceptive attacks to identify threat actors. In our
experiments, arguments are defeated based on contradicting information in other arguments
without any preference in terms of confidence in the arguments being defeated. A proba-
bilistic variant of DeLP [114], can result in a preference list to decide defeat of an argument
in case of contradiction.
In addition to understanding and identifying threat actors, we also ask: how do re-
searchers train and evaluate frameworks? The DEFCON CTF competition is designed to
make the incentive structure match the real world: contestants only receive points when
they hack into a system. The one thing teams in the CTF competition are not concerned
with is being discovered by other teams. The goal is to exploit vulnerabilities and score as
many points as possible. There is no incentive in the form of extra points awarded for being
deceptive where the target team cannot identify the adversary. In real world attack scenarios
where deception is an important goal, attackers employ different strategies to protect their
identity i.e. masking their IP address, using other systems as decoy to launch their attacks
and so on. There might me instances where such behavior occurs in the CTF competition
(see Chapter 2) but is not the priority with no incentives attached. To study and encourage
such behavior we designed our own CTF competition recently presented in [105]. By
motivating the contestants to employ deception, the data we gather will be more relevant to
studying deception in attribution while retaining ground truth. As the game masters we can
maintain visibility of the true facts of the game, and we can contrast contestant performance
with the performance of algorithms developed for the purpose of countering deception. The
framework is also capable of capturing host-level interactions that occur in the context of
the vulnerable running program. We make our platform available as open-source software.
It can be downloaded from: https://github.com/trailofbits/attribution-vm.
In Chapter 4, we analyze malicious samples by running them inside a sandbox to capture
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the behavior on the host machine in terms of network and file activity. There are cases of
highly-sophisticated malware that in addition to using encryption and packing to limit static
analysis, also employ methods to “shut down” when run in a sandbox environment [72].
Methods to address such cases such as the technique of “spatial analysis” [44] that involves
direct analysis of a malware binary can he helpful.
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